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China has been Asia's financial roach motel for years. What we
describe as theft is going on in China on a large scale.
-ADM Capital Director Rob Appleby'
1. INTRODUCTION

The collapse of Zhu Kuan Development Company Limited
("ZKG") was the second largest bankruptcy in the history of the
People's Republic of China ("PRC").2 The face-off between Zhuhai
Municipal Government's ("ZMG") collapsed window company
ZKG3 and its creditors began nearly five years after the People's
Republic of China ("PRC") initiated its efforts to clean up state-

1 Chris Leahy, Asia's Corporate Horrors-Are Lessons From The Crisis Already
Forgotten?, ASIAMONEY, Oct. 1, 2004, at 18, available at LEXIS News & Business,
News, News, All (English, Full Text).
2 Associated Press, Major Chinese Investment Company Declared Bankrupt,
CHINAONLINE, June 7, 2004, available at LEXIS News & Business, News, News, All
(English, full text).
3 Jane Moir, 'Riviera' Turns into Black Hole: Investors Who Bet Zhuhai Would Be
Asia's Monte Carlo Have Found That the Odds Were Stacked, S. CHINA MORNING POST,
Oct. 14, 2004, at 2, available at 2004 WLNR 6020042. A window company is a company controlled by a PRC governmental entity and used to borrow money abroad,
invest it in enterprises in the geographic area under that governmental entity, and
then repay lenders with the money made from the investments. See Matthew
Miller & Mark L. Clifford, Losing Millions in Zhuhai, Bus. WEEK (INT'L ED.), Dec. 1,
2003, at 20, available at 2003 WLNR 9521676 (describing Western creditors' loss of
millions from window company investments in the city of Zhuhai).
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owned window companies plagued by mismanagement, 4 7poor
6
corporate disclosure, 5 corruption, and other illegal activities fol4 See Associated Press, supra note 2 (discussing corporate malpractice and illadvised investments in China); Jane Moir, Zhuhai Unit Faces Collapse, Creditor
Banks Are Threatening to Liquidate Zhu Kuan Group After Getting an 'Insulting' Debt
Restructuring Offer, S. CHINA MORNING POST, July 19, 2003, at 1, available at 2003
WLNR 5863317 (describing mismanagement of investments and reckless investments in China); see also Matt Miller, Macau Bid to Unravel Zhu Kuan Debt Tangle,
THE STANDARD, May 6, 2004, availableat 2004 WLNR 9989539 (asserting that many
Chinese local government conglomerates were run very poorly).
5 See Jianbo Lou, China's Bank Non-Performing Loan Problem: Seriousness and
Causes, 34 INT'L LAW. 1147, 1173 n.167 (2000) (noting that generally poor disclosure
practices in the PRC, including at State Owned Enterprises ("SOEs"), make it difficult for creditors to determine when to initiate bankruptcy proceedings SOEs);
Mark E. Monfort, Reform of the State-Owned Enterpriseand the Bankruptcy Law in the
People's Republic of China, 22 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 1067, 1106-07 (1997) (underscoring the failure of corporate disclosure practice in SOEs by noting the lack of reliable information); Xian Chu Zhang, The Old Problems, the New Law, and the Developing Market-A Preliminary Examination of the First Securities Law of the People's
Republic of China, 33 INT'L LAW. 983, 989 n.57 (1999) (describing the PRC corporate
environment as conducive to SOE failures to disclose and-even more strikingly- blatant fraud, and describing a case in which a company failed to disclose
significant interests over two years).
6 See Stanley Lubman, Bird in a Cage: Chinese Law Reform After Twenty Years,
20 Nw. J.INT'L L. & Bus. 383, 404-05 (2000) ("The corruption problem seems only to
worsen. So tightly knit are corrupt practices into the fabric of modern Chinese society that they are almost invisible. Invoice fraud, diversion of government investment capital, bribery, and misappropriation of central and local government
funds all seem to have become a way of life.... The universal assumption that all
officials and corporate managers are corrupt is probably responsible for the speed
with which disgruntled workers take to the streets; civil protest, mostly peaceful,
is reported almost daily by the foreign (not Chinese) press in China.") US-China
Business Council, China's Political Developments, in US-China Business Council
Comp., China Operations '98 5 (unpublished materials from China Operations '98,
a conference held in Beijing, Feb. 17-18, 1998) (on file with Stanley Lubman));
Moir, supra note 4. See also Helena Kolenda, One Party, Two Systems: Corruption in
the People's Republic of China and Attempts to Control It, 4 J.OF CHINESE L. 187 (1990)
(discussing Chinese corruption); Conita S. C. Leung, Chinese Administrative Law
Package: Limitations and Prospects, 28 H.K. L.J. 104, 104-105 (discussing the structural problems that lead to China's corruption problem); Corruption Perceptions
Index 2005, Transparency International, http://www.transparency.org/policy
_andresearch/surveysjindices/cpi/2005 (last visited Apr. 1, 2006) (giving a
mere 3.2 points out of ten to China, with ten being least corrupt and zero being
most corrupt).
7 See Associated Press, supra note 2 (discussing illegal lending and corporate
malpractice by Chinese companies listed on domestic exchanges); Executions,
Crime Reported in China, BBC MONITORING INT'L Rrs., Sept. 13, 2002, at 1, 1-3, (discussing punishment meted out for various corrupt practices, illegal issuance of
bonds, and related activities); Tom Mitchell, Vice-Governor May Find Ghosts Not
His Only Problem, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Apr. 10, 2001, at 6, available at 2001
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lowing Guandong International Trade and Investment Corporation's ("GITIC") $4.7 billion bankruptcy in 1999,8 the largest ever in
the PRC.9 Despite these red flags (sometimes apparent, sometimes
not), window companies had little trouble obtaining loans, 10 thanks
to the assumption by large international banks that they had one of
the best kinds of insurance you could get: state backing." Despite
the central government's warnings that these assumptions were
invalid, 12 local 13 state actors readily encouraged them.
During the mid-1990s, many local governments in the PRC had
to put their prized infrastructural projects on hold while funding
was scant. The only places to obtain funds were from domestic
banks charging high interest rates or from cumbersome equity inWLNR 3759361 (noting illegal deposit taking, illegal lending, and financial irregularities); Nhu-Nguyen Ngo, The Chinese Cycle: Between Overheating and Overcapacities, CONJONCTURE, May-April, 2004, at 22, available at http://economicrsearch.bnpparibas.com/applis/www/RechEco.nsf/ConjonctureDateEN/1730D
CC9555CDF2DC1256E8A0046DOE6/$File/C0404 A2.pdf?OpenElement (last visited Apr. 1, 2006) (noting the incumbent advantages and abuses of the Chinese
quasi-state-owned banking system). See also Michele Lee, Note and Comment,
Franchisingin China: Legal Challenges When First Entering the Chinese Market, 19 AM.
U. INT'L L. REV. 949, 985 (noting that rules go unenforced at the regional level because local officials gain financially from the furtherance of illegal activity); Leahy,
supra note 1 (implying that ITICs are "examples of Asia's corporate miscreants.");
Benjamin L. Liebman, Watchdog or Demagogue? The Media in the Chinese Legal System, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 30-31 (2005) (noting that most cases of illegal activities
are among those with connections to officials, just like the connections between
Zhu Kuan Development Company Limited ("ZKG") and Zhuhai Municipal Government ("ZMG")); id. at 73 n.133 (discussing the illegal activities of construction
enterprises).
8 Jane Moir, Standard Bearer Sticks to the Official Script, S. CHINA MORNING
POST, Dec. 20, 2004, at 16, available at 2004 WLNR 14352107.
9 See Associated Press, supra note 2 (noting that Guandong International
Trade and Investment Corporation's ("GITIC") bankruptcy was the largest in
China).
10 See Miller, supra note 4, at 1 ("[M]any local government conglomerates...
were able to entice international investors to pour millions of dollars into them.").
11 See Associated Press, supra note 2, at 1 ("GITIC's failure highlighted the
risks of investments in government-backed ventures that lenders had assumed
would be guaranteed by the state but in fact were not."); Moir, supra note 8, at 16
(discussing the legacy of the collapse of government-owned window companies).
12 See Sophie Roell, Zhuhai Deal May Soften State Stance on Financing, FIN.
TIMEs, Aug. 2, 1996, at 24 ("Under central government guidelines, foreign borrowing for infrastructure should be on the basis of the economic viability of projects,
rather than the support of the state.").
13 I will use "local" to refer to any governmental subdivision smaller than the
PRC central government.
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vestments from central government backed financial institutions. 14
The PRC had traditionally allowed little flexibility in procuring financing from abroad, worried about its own potential foreign debt
obligations should it have to foot the bill and also about uncreditworthy entities driving up the costs of borrowing. The PRC, looking to ease the infrastructure financing crunch and relieve the burden of the PRC's floundering banking industry, 5 gradually
became more flexible, allowing more and more companies to seek
funding abroad despite the potentially higher costs. 16 Presented
with this opportunity, local governments, in addition to issuing securities abroad, also sought loans from international banks. 17
In the 1990s these banks were eager to "pave the way" 18 for
market entry into the PRC, regarded by many as the world's biggest market, by developing strong guanxi in the PRC with whomever they could. 19 This led to what, in retrospect, can be called
reckless lending to state-owned window companies of questionable financial status, ZKG included. 20 The repeated collapses of
such state-owned window companies during the late 1990s left
many banks that had lent to these SOEs-both international and
21
domestic - burnt.
14 Lester J. Gesteland, China's US$1.58 Bond Offering a Smashing Success,

May 18, 2001, available at LEXIS News & Business, Country & Region (excluding U.S.), Asia/Pacific Rim Archive News.
15 Leahy, supra note 1, at 18.
16 Roell, supra note 12, at 24.
17 Gesteland, supra note 14.
18 Moir, supra note 8.
19 Guanxi is the Chinese word for informal relationships or connections that
continues to be key to doing business in the PRC. Clyde D. Stoltenberg, Globalization, "Asian Values," and Economic Reform: The Impact of Tradition and Change on
Ethical Values in Chinese Business, 33 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 711, 720 (2000); but see New
Strategy for Multinationals in China, ASIA TIMES ONLINE, Apr. 30, 2005,
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/GD30Ad06.html (contending that guanxi
alone are now insufficient to accomplish much of what they once could). For indepth discussions of guanxi, see Ji Li & Chalmer E. Labig Jr., Negotiating with
China: Exploratory Study of Relationship-Building,13 J. OF MANAGERIAL IssuEs 345
(2001); Patricia Pattison & Daniel Herron, The MountainsAre High and the Emperor
Is Far Away: Sanctity of Contract in China, 40 AM. Bus. L.J. 459, 484-85 (2003); Randall Peerenboom, Globalization, Path Dependency and the Limits of Law: Administrative Law Reform and Rule of Law in the People's Republic of China, 19 BERKELEY J. INT'L
L.161, 222-23 (2001), and Stoltenberg, supra at 720-25.
20 Moir, supra note 3; Moir, supra note 8.
21 Moir, supra note 8, at 16. See also Miller, supra note 4 (" [ZKG's liquidation]
could be the closing chapter for one of the last of China's many debt-plagued inCHINAONLINE,
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This comment will seek to tell the story of the Zhu Kuan case
and draw out the lessons learned by creditors from the case by fitting it into the larger picture of PRC cross-border insolvency. It
will begin with a comprehensive review of the Zhu Kuan case.
First, I will discuss ZKG's development in the context of aggressive
development policies by ZMG. I will begin the look at ZKG's financial difficulties through three cases involving ZKG subsidiaries:
the ZHC's bonds, ZKD's stock, and the Glencore debt scandal involving ZKT. After looking at these specific cases, I will take a
broader look at the reasons for ZKG's financial difficulties. From
there I will discuss the dispute between ZKG and its creditors,
starting with pre-liquidation negotiations in 2000 through its termination in 2005. I will then analyze the most prominent legal
problems reflected in the case and finally conclude with some of
the apparent practical lessons.
2.

FACTS

2.1. ZKG's Development
2.1.1. ZMG's developmental planning
Zhuhai City, with a population of over 1.2 million, 22 is in
Guangdong Province adjacent to Macau and just across the Pearl
River Delta from Hong Kong. In 1979, the central government designated Zhuhai one of the first four special economic zones
vestment and trading companies that lured foreign investors to their ruin in the
mid-1990s."); Moir, supra note 3, at 1 ("[M]ost banks in the region are familiar
[with debtors' bankruptcies] as several international trust and investment corporations- or ITICs-across the mainland have faltered to various degrees following the onset of the Asian financial crisis."). GITIC was placed into bankruptcy in
1999 by PRC authorities with US$4.7 billion in debt. Guangdong Enterprises
(Holding) staved off bankruptcy with "a tortuous workout" that saw HKD 3.5 billion in debt restructured after their 1998 collapse. Moir, supra note 8. There is also
suspicion that this pattern may be starting in the private sector. See Moir, supra
note 8, at 16 ("[T]he fear is that similar problems are emerging with many
mainland private enterprises. Standard Chartered, for example, was one of several lenders involved in a syndicated loan to Far East Pharmaceutical Holdings,
whose chairman vanished across the border. A large hole was subsequently discovered in Far East's accounts.").
22 Population Data in 2002, ZHU HAI CHINA: A CITY OF ROMANCE, http://www.
zhuhai.gov.cn/english/360571644189605888/20030625/1036926.html (last visited
Apr. 1, 2006).
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("SEZs").23 Zhuhai succeeded in getting this designation due to its
proximity to Macau in an effort to exploit the potential of bringing
investment to the PRC from or via Macau. 24 SEZs, Zhuhai included, enact their own unique regimes of local regulations and
thus have economic systems and policies that differ from those the
central government applies to the rest of the PRC.25 While there is
a strong argument to be made that the SEZs were extremely successful,26 Beijing's divestment of power undoubtedly left the SEZs
large leeway to create their own successes or failures.
Zhuhai's plan was ambitious. Liang, Zhuhai's mayor from
1983 to 1998 and concurrently Zhuhai Communist Party Secretary,
had aggressive goals to transform Zhuhai through massive infrastructure projects funded from wherever funding was to be had.
Much of ZKG's debt financed these projects of this "Mayor of
Roads and Bridges," as Liang came to be known. 27 Liang, who
23 Concerning the Establishment of Special Economic Zone in Guangdong
Province, (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat'l People's Congress, effective
August 26, 1980) available at ISONOLAW 503-131795. See John Zhengdong Huang,
An Introduction to Foreign Investment Law in the People's Republic of China, 28 J.
MARSHALL L. REV. 471, 471-72 (1995) (explaining that, in SEZs, investors benefit
from tax breaks, a reduction in administrative hurdles, duty-free imports of
equipment needed to set up factories, as well as other various benefits). See also
The Rise and Rise of an SEZ, Hong Kong Imail Emerging Markets Datafile, Jan. 23,
2002, available at LEXIS 200201233920.m20 (noting that the other four 1979 SEZs
were Shantou [in eastern Guangdong], Shenzhen [adjacent to Hong Kong], and
Xiamen [adjacent to Taiwan]).
24 In explaining the choice, Deng Xiaoping said, "[wihen we decided to establish the four special economic zones in 1979, we chose them mainly on the basis of
their geographical advantages. Shenzhen is adjacent to Hong Kong, and Zhuhai
is close to Macao. We chose Shantou because there are many natives of nearby
Chaozhou living in Southeast Asian countries. Xiamen became a special economic zone because many natives of southern Fujian have emigrated to other
countries and gone into trade." Deng Xiaoping, Remarks Made During an Inspection Tour of Shanghai (Jan. 28-Feb. 18, 1991), available at http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/dengxp/vol3/text/ d1180.html (last visited Apr. 1, 2006).
25 Bin Xue Sang, Pudong: Another Special Economic Zone in China? - An Analysis of the Special Regulations and Policyfor Shanghai'sPudong New Area, 14 N.W. J.
IN'L L. & Bus. 130, 132 (1993).
26 See id. at 131-32 ("[Miany observers attribute much of the success of
China's economic reform and its exciting economic development to the achievements of the SEZs and the coastal cities."). See also Daniel J. Brink and Xiao Lin Li,
A Legal and Practical Overview of Direct Investment and Joint Ventures in the "New"
China, 28 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 567, 571 (1995) ("Provinces [with SEZs] have experienced tremendous changes and stunning economic development.").
27 Miller & Clifford, supra note 3 (explaining that Liang's namesake derived
from the infrastructural building spree that took place in Zhuhai under Liang's
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stepped down in 1998, had begun a trend that resulted in US$13
billion being throttled into infrastructure, including some of the
PRC's most well-known white elephants. 28 Nevertheless, Liang
was largely successful in transforming Zhuhai, which now has a
GDP of US$5 billion and is the PRC home of the operations of an
array of multi-national corporations. 29 However, by the time he
stepped down, it had become clear that Zhuhai "was in serious30 financial trouble and Liang's recklessness was part of the cause."
Zhuhai has not yet shed any of their grand ambitions despite
the financial difficulties. In 2002, ZMG proclaimed that Zhuhai
would become the "Riviera of China" in a plan that would cost
RMB 10 billion.31 While the soppy marketing scheme still lingers
on the Internet, 32 the investment plan itself and others fizzled out
as ZMG's financial difficulties gradually came to light.33 ZMG's
current development plan consists of a long list of Party-approved
34
platitudes that manages to be vague and grand in one stroke.

direction and with the help of funds raised by ZKG).
28 Miller and Clifford note that:
He built a highLiang's reach eventually exceeded his grasp.
performance motor speedway, but the Formula One event he lobbied for
never arrived. He constructed an [US]$800 million international airport,
but never received Beijing's permission to land overseas flights there.
Today, the little-used facility is one of China's most notorious white elephants, serving fewer passengers in a year than Hong Kong does in a
week. Under Liang, Zhuhai even started construction on a 30-kilometer
bridge and causeway complex to span the mouth of the Pearl River and
connect Zhuhai to Hong Kong. In the end, the bridge stopped at an island just 3 km from Zhuhai.
Id.
Id.
Id. (quoting Joseph Cheng, Chair Professor of Political Science, City University of Hong Kong).
31 Moir, supra note 3.
32 See, e.g., At East by the Sea - A Zhuhai Idyll, SHANGHAI STAR, May 24, 2003,
available at http://www.china.org.cn/english/travel/65366.htm (list visited Apr.
1, 2006) ("The romance of Zhuhai can be seen at first glance from the flowers
blooming everywhere but especially when you notice that the name of the street
you're walking down means 'Lover' in Chinese.").
33 Moir, supra note 3.
34 The "Basic Development Concept and Target" of the ZMPC and the ZMG
consists of:
29
30

[P]ushing forward the new-style industrialization, optimizing economic
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However, various past investment plans have turned out to be
miserable failures or were not even able to be completed. With this
record of failures belying a precarious financial state, any progress
towards lofty goals is questionable.
2.1.2. ZKG's history and business
According to suspiciously legend-like reports in PRC stateowned media, ZKG began humbly as a mere teahouse in 1980 with
only HKD 2,000 in capital. 35 ZMG began to mold ZKG into its current form when the PRC began urging local governments to set up
their own foreign trade representative offices to deal directly with
foreigners in the mid-1980s. 36 With this imprimatur from Beijing,
on February 13, 1988, ZMG incorporated ZKG in Macau for the
sole purpose of financing investment in Zhuhai from Macau, 37 and,
four years later on May 19, 1992, ZMG incorporated ZKG subsidiary ZKHK in Hong Kong to play the same role in relation to Hong
Kong. 38 In an August 19, 1995 letter of undertaking to SCB, ZMG
described ZKG and ZKHK as "economic and trading entities repstructure and strengthening the industrial base, adopting the West Wing
Strategy, quickening the urbanization, promoting the regional economic
co-ordinate development, quickening the development of the sea port
and the airport, perfecting the city road network, promoting regional
economic co-operation, implementing the strategy of "revitalizing Zhuhai with science and education", running well the university campus, reinforcing the city's core competition, pushing forward the reform and the
creation of economic structure and management, perfecting socialist
market economic system, thus constructing the platform of invigorating
Zhuhai by industrialization, science and education and eco-environment,
and a base of the high-tech industry with the information technology as
the lead, of the manufacturing, study and research with comparative attraction, of the high value added export commodities, and building Zhuhai into a modem, rich and civilized regional central city with a beautiful
environment, booming economy and good social orders.
Zhuhai Service Center for Foreign Investment, Profile of Zhuhai, at http://www.
zhuhai.com.cn/english/index.asp?id=1020 (last visited Apr. 1, 2006).
35 Associated Press, supra note 2.
36 Teresa Ma, Programme of DecentralisationLeads to Reorganisation/Profileof the
Nam Kwong trading group, FIN. TIMES, Apr. 10, 1985, at 3, available at 1985 WLNR
415720.
37 RSM Nelson Wheeler Corporate Asia Group, Report to Creditors, Jan. 11,
2005, para. 6 [hereinafter RSM]; Moir, supra note 3.
38 RSM, supra note 37, para. 6; Jane Moir, Zhu Kuan Creditors Seek Action; Bankers' Mistrust Grows as Questions Over Missing Cash Go Unanswered, S. CHINA
MORNING PosT, Aug. 15, 2003, at 1, available at 2003 WLNR 5851735.
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resenting [ZMG]"39 but in actuality they behaved as investment
holding companies, conducting business primarily through subsidiaries 40 in an array of industries. 41 Especially prominent was
ZKG's key role in financing a wide array of infrastructure projects
in Zhuhai.42 Nevertheless, ZKG had no business that generated a
substantial cash flow. 43 Its core asset was land from its real estate
activities, worth nearly RMB11 billion, of which 73% was in Zhuhai,44 23% in Macau, 45 and the remainder in Hong Kong.
Over the years, ZKG's activities spanned a broad range of
business activities. Its principal businesses were its real estate activities in Zhuhai, Hong Kong and Macau; 46 trading operations,
mainly in Zhuhai and Macau; 47 tourism ventures in Zhuhai and
Macau,

48

such as water parks, 49 theme parks,

°

and hotels;5 l and

civil engineering, primarily in Macau.5 2 Other business activities
included automobile services; 5 3 light industry, including manufac39 In the Matter of Zhu Kuan Group Co. Ltd., HCCW 874/2003 para. 3,
(H.K.L.R.D., Dec. 19, 2003) available at http://legalref.judiciary.gov.hk/lrs/common/search/search resultdetail-frame.jsp?DIS=43_103&QS= %28zhu%2Bkuan%
29&TP=JU [hereinafter Re ZKG 2004]; RSM, supra note 37, para. 6.
40 Id. para. 9.
41 For the array of industries, see infra figure 1.
42 Miller & Clifford, supra note 3.
43 Moir, supra note 4.
44 Moir, supra note 3.
45 Jane Moir, Liquidators to Take PwC to High Court, S. CHINA MORNING POST,
Sept. 25, 2003, at 1, availableat 2003 WLNR 5951484.
46 Moir, supra note 3; RSM, supra note 37, para. 8.1.
47 Lana Wong, Zhuhai Arm Seeks $100m Through Listing, S. CHINA MORNING
POST, May 1, 1998, at 3, availableat 1998 WLNR 3237217; RSM, supra note 37, para.
8.2.
48 Jane Moir, Zhu Kuan Creditors Offered $2.5b Cash, S. CHINA MORNING POST,
Jan. 20, 2005, at 1, availableat 2005 WLNR 761804.
49 Moir, supra note 3.
50 Jonathan Tam, From Beer to Fashion, Companies Feeling Pinch, THE STANDARD
(CHINA), Apr. 28, 2003, availableat 2003 WLNR 9059835.
51 Jane Moir, $4b Loan to Zhuhai Uncovered; Accounts of the Government's Window Company Zhu Kuan Group Show that $7b is Owed to Banks, S. CHINA MORNING
POST, Aug. 2, 2004, at 1, available at 2004 WLNR 6014562; RSM, supra note 37, para.
8.3.
52 Jane Moir, Zhu Kuan Group Declared Bankrupt: The Decision is the First Liquidation of a Mainland Government Investment Arm by a Hong Kong Court, S. CHINA
MORNING POST, Oct. 5, 2004, at 1, availableat 2004 WLNR 6017250; RSM, supra note
37, para. 8.4.
53 Debbie Chu, Tax Drives Down Ordersfor Mercedes, S. CHINA MORNING POST,
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turing,5 4 textiles, 55 building materials, 56 and electronics; 57 infrastruc60
59
ture, 58 such as water plants, waste treatment plants, bridges,
highways, 61 and telecommunications; 62 and air,63 water, and land
transportation. 64
2.1.3. Structure of the ZKG conglomerate
ZKG was set up as an investment holding company and conducted
business only through subsidiaries, 65 encompassing some fifty companies
in Zhuhai, Macau, and Hong Kong, 66 seventeen of which were in Hong
Kong. 67 ZKG itself was incorporated in Macau in 1988,68 and is 100%
owned by ZMG. 69 ZKG's most significant subsidiary, ZKHK, is involved

Mar. 29, 1994, at 6, availableat 1994 WLNR 2306745.
54 Wong, supra note 47. Manufacturing ventures included at least one joint
venture with Philips to manufacture small domestic appliances and personal care
products. Philips to Invest in Joint Venture in Zhuhai, Xinhua General Overseas
News Services, Jan. 23, 1990, available at LEXIS News & Business, Country & Region (excluding U.S.), Pacific Rim Archive news.
55 Associated Press, supra note 2.
56

Id.

57

Id.

58 Moir, supra note 48.
59 Renee Lai, Rule Change Allows Hunan Firm Easy Path to Listing, S. CHINA
MORNING POST, Dec. 20, 1997, at 3, availableat LEXIS News & Business, Country &
Region (excluding U.S.), Asia/Pacific Rim Archive News.
64 Moir, supra note 3.
61 Id.
62 Zhu Kuan Plans Bus/Cable TV/Internet Investments in Zhuhai, AFX (AP), July
6, 1999, available at LEXIS News & Business, Country & Region (excluding U.S.),
Asia/Pacific Rim Archive News.
63 Jane Moir, Murky Funds Cloud Bridge Ambitions, S. CHINA MORNING POST,
July 19, 2003, at 1, available at 2003 WLNR 5863374; see also id. (quoting a creditor
as saying, "[tihey wanted to make Zhuhai another Shenzhen. The only way to do
it was to build state of the art infrastructure and a state of the art airport. It's ridiculous. Who will want to fly into Zhuhai?"); Moir, supra note 3 ("[Tlhe city's
seven billion yuan airport sits virtually empty....").
64 Moir, supra note 52.
65 Susan Kendall, Foreign Lenders Welcome More Protection in China, 24 INT'L
FIN. L. REV. 41 (2005); see also Re ZKG 2004, supra note 39, para. 3 (citing this exact
description to an affidavit filed on behalf of SCB).
66 Moir, supra note 48.
67 Moir, supra note 52.
68 Associated Press, supra note 2.
69 HK-Listed Zhu Kuan's Controlling Shareholders Face Winding Up Petitions,
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in thirty businesses, with more than a dozen in Hong Kong. 70 Tourism
subsidiary ZKD (renamed JZD in November 2004)71 was listed in Hong
Kong in 1998.72 The following is a summary of the structure of the major
companies relevant to ZKG's bankruptcy.
Figure1: Structure of Selected ZMG-Owned Companies 73
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AFX - ASIA, Aug. 19, 2003 avaiable at LEXIS News & Business, Country & Region
(excluding U.S.), Asia/Pacific Rim News, Current [hereinafter HK-Listed Zhu
Kuan].
70 Matt Miller, StanChart Wins Time for Zhu Kuan Liquidators, THE STANDARD
(CHINA), Apr. 7, 2004, available at 2004 WLNR 9955132.
71 Worldscope, Jiuzhou Development Company Limited, Mar. 15, 2005, available
at LEXIS New & Business, Company & Financial, Company Profiles & Directories,
International Company Reports.
72 Associated Press, supra note 2.
73 HK-Listed Zhu Kuan, supra note 69; Re ZKG 2004, supra note 39, para. 11;
RSM, supra note 37; Lana Wong, Zhu Kuan Backs Low Issue Price, S. CHINA
MORNING POST, May 13, 1998, at 2, availableat 1998 WLNR 3263660.
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2.1.4. ZMG's explicit backing of ZKG and subsidiaries
Generally, government backing of window companies was implicit. 74 While the assumed implicit backing was certainly at play
here, ZMG was nonetheless more than willing to make it explicit
when it suited its purposes. ZKD was "given full support by the
Zhuhai Municipal Government in its development, acknowledging
its status as the only conglomerate supported by the Zhuhai gov75 In
ernment to be listed on the Stock Exchange of Hong Kong."
defending ZKD's record-low issue price, Cai reiterated that "the
company had the support of the Zhuhai government to become its
only diversified listed arm abroad." 76 After the ZKG subsidiary
ZKT's Glencore debt scandal, 77 Yu said, "I think the share price
will not come under pressure [from the scandal] because our com78
pany has quality assets and is supported by the Zhuhai government."
Yu naturally failed to point out that both ZKG and ZKT had had
the backing of ZMG. Nevertheless, strongly pushing ZMG "support" as an asset, and despite never clearly explaining what that
support comprised, ZKD was able to raise huge amounts of
money. 79 There were even numerous cases of explicit backing that
involved what were in effect guaranties from ZMG. From 1994 to
1999, ZMG issued letters to creditors that again stated ZMG's support for ZKG's development but went further, stating that ZMG
would cover any loss suffered by the creditors in certain instances.8 0 This would have accounted for some HKD 2.2 billion of
the debt.81 ZMG ultimately reneged on this, infusing cash enough
only to cover about $1 billion beyond the debt that ZKG had previ74 Adam Luck, Western Banks Hit by Pounds 500m Corporate Collapse in China,
THE SUNDAY TIMES (U.K.), June 6, 2004, at 11, 2004 WLNR 5387985; Miller & Clifford, supra note 3.
75 David Evans, Zhu Kuan Distances Itself from Debt Case, HONG KONG
STANDARD, May 26, 1988, available at LEXIS News & Business, Country & Region
(excluding U.S.), Asia/Pacific Rim Archive News. See also Lana Wong,Mystery
Note Claiming Dishonoured Debts Targets Zhu Kuan Debut, S. CHINA MORNING POST,
May 26, 1998, at 3, available at 1998 WLNR 3261776 (noting the company's comment that it was supported by the Zhuhai government).
76 Id.

77 See infra section 2.2.3.
78

Evans, supra note 75 (emphasis added).

79 Wong, supra note 75; see also infra section 2.2.3.
80

RSM, supra note 37, para. 61.1.

81 Id. para. 193.
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2.1.5. Incestuous relationshipbetween ZMG and ZKD leadership
As the owner of ZKG, ZMG had the ultimate decision-making power
when it so desired. ZMG took advantage of this power over ZKG and
other fully owned enterprises, such as LSG, to run the show from backstage during ZKG's bankruptcy. 83 This was made even easier by the ambiguous separation between ZMG and ZKG. ZMG officials with no positions whatsoever in ZKG were often involved in ZKG decision making
processes, such as debt restructuring negotiations with Wang,8 4 muddying
up the waters of where the line between ZMG and ZKG should be drawn.
To further cloud the waters, officials of ZMG often served as the executives in ZKG and its subsidiaries. 85 Cai, for example, was both the chairman of ZKD and a vice-mayor in ZMG. 86 Finally, cementing ZMG's interest in ZKG, ZMG officials held various pecuniary interests in ZKG
87
companies.

See infra sections 3.1.4, 3.2 and 3.3.
RSM, supra note 37, para. 60.
84 See Moir, supra note 4 ("There is also a concern that the company has said it
will pay off creditors by pledging some of its assets in Zhuhai owned by the government to local banks.").
85 Jane Moir, Zhuhai Government Tries to Grab Big Slice of Zhu Kuan, S. CHINA
MORNING POST, Sept. 9, 2003, at 1, available at 2003 WLNR 5913333.
86 Lana Wong, Zhuhai Government's Hotel Arm Sees Profit Jump 35pc, S. CHINA
MORNING POST, Sept. 23, 1998, at 2, available at 1998 WLNR 3257433. Other directors in ZKG who had previously held positions in ZMG included He Weilong
(Chief-in-Charge, Vice Office Director and Office Director of ZMG), Leong Hok
Peng (Town Master and Deputy Party Secretary of Qianshan Town of Xiangzhou,
Zhuhai, and Vice Office Director of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation
Committee in Xiangzhou, Zhuhai), Liang Caijia (Chief-in-Charge of the Department of Corporate Finance Administration of the Financial Bureau of Zhuhai and
Chief-in-Charge of the Department for Finance Administration of Government
Backed Business of the Financial Bureau of Zhuhai), and Ouyang Guoliang (General Secretary of ZMG and Vice Office Director of the Management Commission
of Zhuhai SEZ). RSM, supra note 37, para. 62.
87 See Interim Report 2003, Zhu Kuan Development Company Limited (Jan.
14, 2004), at 34, http://www.hkex.com.hk/listedco/listconews/sehk/20040121/
00908/EWF101.pdf (listing directors, most of whom hold or have held positions in
ZMG, other ZKG entities, or both, that have exercised the largest share options).
82
83
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2.2. Three Cases Studies
2.2.1. ZHC bonds
ZKG tapped into international debt markets with the first PRC
overseas junk bond, 88 issued by ZHC in the United States to institutional investors in 1996.89 The bonds were issued despite the lack
of any relevant PRC law to protect creditors' interest, and thus relied heavily on ad-hoc contract-made "law." 90 Nevertheless, the
92
bonds were three times oversubscribed, 91 raising $200 million in
two tranches, a $85 million 9.125% ten-year senior tranche rated
Baa3-BBB and a $115 million 11.5% twelve-year subordinated
tranche rated Bal-BB. 93 The bond was a non-recourse loan, meaning no government backing, secured by vehicle registration fees
and road tolls in Zhuhai. 94 All government entities, ZMG included, steered clear from any direct guarantees. ZKG, however,
pledged support should there be an interruption in the revenue
stream or if the company had difficulties in finding foreign currency to service its obligations. 95 ZKG's promise, in light of the
blurry lines between themselves and ZMG, seemed to imply ZMG
support despite ZMG not making any explicit guarantee.
88

Miller, supra note 4.

89 Josephine Ma, Bond Issue Legal, Says Vice-Mayor, S. CHINA MORNING POST,

Oct. 9, 1996, at 4, availableat 1996 WLNR 2778546.
90 Kevin T.S. Kong, Note, Prospects for Asset Securitization Within China's Legal
Framework: The Two-Tiered Model, 32 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 237, 258-60 (1998). The
Highway Law, which covers this sort of financing, was not promulgated until
1998. See Highway Law of the People's Republic of China (amended in 2004 by
the Standing Comm. People's Cong., effective 1998), available at ISINOLAw 38111653 (last visited Apr. 1, 2006) (P.R.C.) (outlining the provisions of the Highway
Law of China).
91 Morag Forrester, China is the Silver Lining, GLOBAL FINANCE, Aug. 1997, at
9 97 08
/
34, available at http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi-qa3715/is_1
ain8761526 (last visited Apr. 1, 2006).
92 Report, Industry Sector Analysis, Mar. 19, 1998, available at LEXIS News &
Business, Country & Region (excluding U.S.), Asia/Pacific Rim Archive News.
93 Bond Offer for Zhuhai, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Aug. 2, 1996, at 3, availableat
1996 WLNR 2777342. For further details about the ZHC bonds, see Kehong Wen,
China's First Eurobond Portends a New Junk Bond Market, TCFA UPDATE, Aug. 5,
1996, http://www.china-finance.org/update/volume2/v2n41.html.
94 Zhuhai Highway Debt Ratings Cut to CCC by S&P, AFX - AsiA, June 29, 2000,
available at LEXIS News & Business, Country & Region (excluding U.S.),
Asia/Pacific Rim Archive News.
95 Roell, supra note 12.
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Four years later, S&P had lowered the rating to junk bond
status following the Asian financial crisis and a period of slower
growth, 96 and after ZKG's defaults against banks 97 and the Glencore scandal 98 had shaken creditor confidence. Nevertheless, some
analysts were still looking at ZHC's bonds as a good investment.
DebtTraders Inc., a Hong Kong based financial services firm wrote:
We believe [ZHC's] senior notes offer an attractive investment opportunity for investors in distressed securities seeking exposure to the toll-road sector in China.... The terms
of the senior notes offer solid protection in case of a default.
Even under our worst-case scenario, there will be more
than sufficient funds available from underlying toll revenues to fully repay holders of senior notes.99
Analysts such as this one seemed to have had a predisposition
to ignore the emerging problems of such government-related investments by still recommending a buy.
Investors who bit this line would ultimately find themselves
hurting. ZHC had relied on optimistic predictions of future revenues based on an "extraordinary" revenue expansion in the mid1990s when issuing the bond, 100 but an economic slowdown resulted in lower vehicle registrations and lower traffic volume than
predicted. 1° 1 ZMG aggravated the situation further by refusing to
implement indenture-mandated annual increases in vehicle registration fees 102 due to political pressures and a deflationary environment.103 ZMG even further aggravated the situation by misappropriating for its own use a portion of tolls collected rather than

96

Gesteland, supra note 14.

97 See infra section 2.3.
98

See infra section 2.2.3.

99 Gesteland, supra note 14.
100 S&P Lowers Highway Rtgs; Still on Watch Neg, BUSINESS WIRE, May 25, 2000,
available at LEXIS News & Business, News, News, All (English, Full Text) [hereinafter Highway Rtgs].
101 S&P Lowers Rating on Notes of China S Zhuhai Highway Co, ASIA PULSE, May
17, 2001, available at LEXIS News & Business, News, News, All (English, Full Text)
[hereinafter S&P Lowers Rating].
102 Id.
103 Id. Had ZMG implemented the increases, it would have had fees higher
than surrounding municipalities. Id.
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place it into the indenture-mandated trust fund. 104 ZMG said
shortfalls would be made up with subsidies and it was unclear
whether this ever happened as of 2001.105 Given ZMG's financial
10 6 it is exstate as seen through ZKG, and despite past subsidies,
tremely doubtful that ZMG had sufficient funds to allocate to a
subsidy. Regardless, the financial situation of ZHC would force
bond maintenance to be subject to the willingness of ZMG to issue
subsidies, 107 hardly reliable given ZMG's various financial problems. Nor did funding from ZKG materialize, despite ZKG's contractual obligation. 08 In fact, the threat of a cross-default from
ZKG's debts loomed large.1 0 9
In July 2000, ZHC defaulted on the subordinated bonds and
soon defaulted on the senior bonds as well.110 By 2001, both
tranches of ZHC bonds had been downgraded to S&P's lowest
1
possible rating, effectively declaring the firm to be in default."
Bondholders soon began putting further pressure on ZKG and
ZMG finances. In April 2001, bondholders, pursuant to the indenture, issued a notice of acceleration to ZMG for immediate payment of the principal and all interest accrued. Trustee CMB distributed to bondholders US$25.6 million held in its accounts as per
1 12
the notice of acceleration.
Expectedly, the acceleration payment was not received.1 1 3 Talk
also arose of lawsuits, 114 but to date none have come to fruition.
Ultimately, bond holders felt compelled to sell off their holdings as
part of workouts structured by companies specializing in dis115
tressed debt.

104
105

106
107
108

109
110
111

Id.
Gesteland, supranote 14.
Highway Rtgs, supra note 100.
Id.
S&P Lowers Rating, supra note 101.
Highway Rtgs, supra note 100.
S&P Lowers Rating, supra note 101.
Gesteland, supra note 14. The rating of D is S&P's lowest possible rating.

Id.
112 S&P Lowers Rating, supra note 101.
113

Id.

Highway Rtgs, supra note 100; S&P Lowers Rating, supra note 101.
Angela Mackay, Asia's Crisis Has Meant Big Returns on Distressed Debt, FIN.
TIMEs, Apr. 7, 2003, at 23.
114

115
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2.2.2. ZKD stock
ZKG tapped into international equity markets with a public listing of
ZKG subsidiary ZKD in Hong Kong in 1998.116 Two years after ZHC's
bond issue, the market tore into this stock issue with fervor: ZKD raised
about HKD 142.38 million by selling 126 million shares at HKD 1.13
each 1 7 to strategic and professional institutional investors and forty-two
million shares" 8 in an IPO that was 10.13 times oversubscribed.1 9 As
ZKG's financial difficulties came to light and ZKD's bottom line suffered
(see table below), ZKD's stock took a dive and now hovers at nearly one20
third of the initial price.'
Table 1: ZKD (JZD) Performance Statistics

Year

Net Profit
(HKD
million)

2004121
2003122
2002123
2001124
2000125
1999126

12.1
1.7
4.808
23.952
30.173
13.077

2004127

0.9
(6.4)
20.204
37.436
6.793

2003m-s
2002129
2001130
2000131

116

Sales
Operating Pro(HKD
fit (HKD
million)
million)
Six Months to October
114.2
93.9
111.191
0.533
147.469
23.952
169.015
29.542
116.75
16.37
Fiscal Year to April_
193.6
208.6
255.559
10.611
300.835
33.022
233.850
12.435

Earnings
per Share
(HK$)

0.0060
0.0300
0.0378
0.0294

0.0253
0.0469
0.0149

Zhu Kuan Development Public Offering 10 Times Subscribed, S. CHINA

MORNING POST, May 19, 1998 at 3, available at 1998 WLNR 3237057.
117

Wong, supranote 75.

118

Wong, supranote 73.

119 Cathy Holcombe, 'China Plays Need Rethink on Pricing,' S. CHINA MORNING
POST, May 25, 1998, at 1, available at 1998 WLNR 3251844.
120 JZD, as ZKD had been renamed, traded around HKD 0.43 in March of
2005. Main Board and Trading Only Stocks Daily Quotations, The Stock Exchange of
Hong Kong Limited, Mar. 15, 2005, at http://www.hkex.com.hk/markdata/
quot/d050315e.htm (last visited Apr. 1, 2006).
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a
As provisional liquidator, RSM was seeking to stake out 132
claim over the 71.7% of ZKD shares owned by ZKHK and PIV
and negative media reports prompted ZKD to suspend trading in
its shares, 133 ZKD proposed a general mandate to buy back up to
10% of its sharesM and issue or allot up to 20% in new stock,135 all
EXTEL, Jiuzhou Development Company Ltd., Mar. 11, 2005, available at
LEXIS News & Business, Country & Region (excluding U.S.), Asia Pacific, Company & Financial, Extel Cards Database - Asia/ Pacific Stories.
122 Id.
123 Zhu Kuan Development HI Net Profit 4.808 Mln Hkd Vs 23.952 Min, AFX Asia, Jan. 24, 2003, availableat LEXIS News & Business, Country & Region (excluding U.S.), Asia/Pacific Rim Archive News [hereinafter HI Net Profit].
124 Id.
125 Zhu Kuan Development HI Net Profit 23.952 Mln Hkd Vs 30.173, AFX - ASIA,
Jan. 28, 2002, available at LEXIS News & Business, Country & Region (excluding
U.S.), Asia/Pacific Rim Archive News [hereinafter HI Net Profit 23.952]. The large
jump in profits between 1999 and 2000 was due to accounting changes rather than
to any actual profitability improvement. Don Gasper, Tourism Operator's Profit
Soars 130pc, HONG KONG IMAIL, Jan. 25, 2001, available at Emerging Markets Datafile, available at LEXIS News & Business, Country & Region (excluding U.S.),
Asia/Pacific Rim Archive News.
126 Zhu Kuan Development Hi to Oct Net Profit 30.17 Mln Khd Vs 13.07, AFX ASIA, Jan. 23, 2001, available at LEXIS News & Business, Country & Region (excluding U.S.), Asia/Pacific Rim Archive News.
127 EXTEL, supra note 121.
128 Id.
129 Zhu Kuan FY Net Profit 20.204 Mln Hkd Vs 37.436, AFX - ASIA, Aug. 28,
2002, available at LEXIS News & Business, Country & Region (excluding U.S.),
Asia/Pacific Rim Archive News [hereinafter FY Net Profit].
130 Id.
131 Zhu Kuan Development Co Ltd: (Newsweb) FinalResults for Year to 30-Apr2000 Were Released, Extel Company News, Sept. 28, 2000, available at LEXIS News
& Business, Country & Region (excluding U.S.), Asia/Pacific Rim Archive News;
Zhu Kuan Development FY Net Profit 37.43 Mln Hkd vs 6.79, AFX - ASIA, Jan. 29,
2001, available at LEXIS News & Business, Country & Region (excluding U.S.),
Asia/Pacific Rim Archive News.
132 Jane Moir & Christine Chan, Zhu Kuan Returns to Debt Talks; The Zhuhai
Government Raises Its Cash Settlement Offer But CreditorBanks Remain Unimpressed,
S. CHINA MORNING POST, Aug. 30, 2003, at 1, availableat 2003 WLNR 5887638.
133 The Stock Exchange of Hong Kong, Zhu Kuan Dev -Suspension of Trading, Aug. 15, 2003, at http://www.hkex.com.hk/listedco/listconews/sehk/
20030815/ltn20030815067.htm (last visited Apr. 1, 2006).
134 Notice of Annual General Meeting, Zhu Kuan Development Company
Limited (Aug. 26, 2003), at 4, http://www.hkex.com.hk/listedco/listconews/
121
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without telling the 29.3% of non-ZKG shareholders that PIV was
subject to a winding-up petition. 136 While not explicitly stated, the
purpose of the new stock moves seems to have been to either raise
money to pay off debts or to dilute RSM's potential stake in ZKD.
Given the weakened price of ZKD's stock 37 and the wording of the
proposal, 138 the latter seems the more likely of the two. Moreover,
this proposed new issuing was despite a HKD 6.4 million loss during 2002-2003 following a HKD 20.2 million profit during 20012002.139 ZKD sought approval at its general meeting on September
26.140 It seems the plan would be to attempt to buy back 10% from
ZKHK, for whom RSM has not yet perfected its claim, and issue
new stocks to those under ZMG's control but not part of the ZKG
bankruptcy. Assuming the full percentages requested were used,
and depending on which was done first, ZMG could have potentially reduced RSM's share from a maximum 71.7% to either 57.1%
or 55.3%.
Although media reports regarding the liquidation proceedings
were abundant, ZKD only came to reveal the full extent of the issue in a warning to investors after ZKG had been declared bankrupt in Hong Kong, stating:

sehk/20030828/00908/EWF104.pdf (last visited Apr. 1, 2006).
135 Id. at 6.
136

Moir, supra note 85.

Before suspension, ZKD's stock was last traded at HKD 0.294. HK's Zhu
Kuan Development Suspended Pending Clarificationof Press Reports, AFX - ASIA, Aug.
15, 2003, available at LEXIS News & Business, Country & Region (excluding U.S.),
Asia/Pacific Rim News, Current. See also Audrey Parwani, We Will Pay Our Debt,
Says Zhu Kuan, S. CHINA MORNING POST, May 27, 1998, at 1, available at 1998 WLNR
3242827 (stating that ZKD's stock was issued at HKD 1.13 and reached a high of
HKD 1.42).
138 The proposal grants directors a variety of options regarding new shares
"subject to such exclusions or other arrangements as the Directors may deem necessary or expedient in relation to fractional entitlements" and allows them to direct these "to officers and/or employees of the Company and/or any of its subsidiaries and/or any eligible grantee pursuant to the scheme of shares or rights to
acquire shares of the Company," providing ample leverage to exclude any shares
controlled by RSM in future plans regarding the issuing of new stock and thereby
diluting the stake controlled by the creditors. Notice of Annual General Meeting,
supra note 134, at 5-6.
139 Results Announcement, Zhu Kuan Development Company Limited (Aug.
26, 2003), at http://www.hkex.com.hk/listedco/listconews/sehk/20030826/
ltn20030826083.htm (last visited Apr. 1, 2006).
137

140

Moir, supra note 85.
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Though the winding up of Zhu Kuan Group and Zhu Kuan
(Hong Kong) does not automatically render the above share
charges to be varied or void, there arises additional uncertainty in such matter .... If there is a change in the registered holder of the Pioneer charged shares or in the beneficial owner and/or registered holder of the shares held by
Zhuhai Industrial and charged to Bank of China, there may
be a change in the composition of the board of directors of
the company and/or change in the business of the group.141
Nevertheless, ZKD had no intention of letting RSM take control
of the shares if they still had the means to prevent it. In September
2003, RSM, having already laid claim to a 42.2% stake from PIV, attempted to appoint three new directors to the board of ZKD at
ZKD's annual general meeting.142 To RSM's shock, ZKD directors
barred them from voting on PIV's behalf because, according to
ZMG and based on advice from Chiu & Partners' Grace Chan, LSG
held the stakes' voting rights as the holder of the mortgaged
shares. 43 ZKD, apparently fearing that the meeting would turn acrimonious, had both security guards and video cameras keeping an
eye on the proceeding.144 The issue of stock ownership appears to
never have been resolved independent of the final settlement.
2.2.3. The Glencore debt scandal
A dramatic early sign of ZKG defaulting on debts, and a portender of how ZKG would behave when facing debt for which they
were unwilling or unable to pay, came just before ZKD's IPO. An
anonymous letter was faxed to the press claiming that ZKG had
failed to honor a US$2.5 million debt to Switzerland-based Glencore International, one of the worlds biggest zinc traders, for zinc
sales contracts fulfilled in 1997 while Glencore was positioned long
141 Foster Wong, Zhu Kuan Liquidation May Lead to Unit's Overhaul, THE
STANDARD, Oct. 9, 2004, available at 2004 WLNR 12005284.
142 Bei Hu & Jane Moir, Zhu Kuan Liquidators Denied

Vote, S. CHINA MORNING
POST, Sept. 26, 2003, at 3, available at 2003 WLNR 5954134. ZKHK owned this
42.2% stake of 337 million shares that was pledged to LSG but subject to litigation.
ZKG owned an additional 29.5% stake of 235.2 million shares that was pledged to
BOC. HK-Listed Zhu Kuan, supra note 69.
143 Hu & Moir, supra note 142.
144 Lai See, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Sept. 26, 2003, at 2, LEXIS News & Business, Country & Region (excluding U.S.), Asia/Pacific Rim News, Current.
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of the market and "certain unnamed mainland traders" were severely short. 145 The letter read:
Zhu Kuan Trading refused to make payment to Glencore
and has since closed its office and disconnected its phone
Glencore has begun legal proceedings before the
line ....
ICC (International Chamber of Commerce) in London to
collect the sum .... The stock offering prospectus describes
the Zhu Kuan Group as having an "excellent reputation"
and being "highly reputable." However, Glencore claims
its attempts to have the group honour its debts of its trad146
ing arm been rebuffed.
Yu noted that ZKG was investigating and seeking to clarify the
matter. 47 Cai could not, or perhaps would not, confirm that148GlenYu
core was among ZKG's "many import and export clients."
further noted that ZKG had not received any claims for unpaid
0
debts. 149 Nevertheless, ZKG dismissed the allegations. 5 Yu questioned the motives behind the letter, a valid suspicion given the nature of the letter and that it specifically said the Glencore scandal
would "cloud the prospects for the shares of another Zhu Kuan
company scheduled to begin trading on the Hong Kong stock exchange." 151 Cai then went further, decrying the letter, sent on May
25, 1998,152 as an attempt to sabotage ZKD's IPO on the following
day and even threatened legal action "to defend its reputation and
153
to claim for damages for all defamatory acts against the group."
Unsurprisingly, no such legal action ever appears to have materialized.
ZKD disingenuously sidestepped the underlying implication
Evans, supra note 75.
Wong, supra note 75. The PRC had joined the ICC in 1995, several years
before the Glencore scandal. China Becomes Member of ICC, HERALD SUN, Jan. 12,
1995, available at LEXIS News & Business, News, News, All (English, Full Text).
147 Parwani, supra note 137; see also Wong, supra note 75 (noting that Yu dismissed the allegations saying "the parent company was seeking to clarify the matter").
148 Parwani, supra note 137.
145

146

149

Id.

150

Wong, supra note 75.

151

Id.

152

Parwani, supra note 137.
Id.; Wong, supranote 75.

153
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that ZKG would not pay any future ZKD debts by simply moving
to distance itself from ZKT. Yu said, "[t]here is no relationship between [ZKD] and [ZKT] other than we both belong to the same
conglomerate [ZKG]."154 That, of course, was exactly the problem
the letter was trying to point out. Cai said, "[t]he subject matter of
the allegations does not relate to [ZKD] and its subsidiaries and
hence does not have any impact on the group." 15 5 Yu expanded on
this, emphasizing that the scandal would not affect the listed company as ZKD was "only a tourism-related company," 15 6 that ZKD's
"only interests are a theme park and hotels," 15 7 and that ZKD had
not engaged in any raw material trading and did not itself owe any
money to Glencore. 158 ZKD further emphasized that it always honors its debts.15 9 ZKD directors seemed oblivious to the fact that
business operations had little to do with the fact that ZKT and the
parent it shared with ZKD clearly had some difficulties in always
honoring their debts. Nevertheless, the scandal appears to have
been resolved quietly since it disappeared off the radar as quickly
as it had appeared, even though ZKG's other debt issues would
soon become a major problem once again.
2.3. ZKG's FinancialDifficulties
ZKG was among the leading mainland window companies
during the 1990S.160 A pattern emerged in ZKG bonds, stocks, and
banks loans in which analysts would give a thumbs-up and major
institutional investors would pony up massive sums of money, assuming government backing and eager to tap the PRC market.
These are the international institutions that would feel the pinch
when ZKG's problems finally caught up with it.
ZKG's financial difficulties first began to emerge at the beginning of the Asian Financial Crisis in 1997161 when it became unable
to obtain additional financing.162 ZKG's problems were only exac154
155
156
157
158
159
160
161
162

Evans, supra note 75.
Parwani, supra note 137.
Wong, supra note 75.
Evans, supra note 75.
Wong, supra note 75.
Parwani, supra note 137.
Zhu Kuan Development Public Offering 10 Times Subscribed, supra note 116.
Miller, supra note 4.
Miller & Clifford, supra note 3.

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014

U. Pa.J. Int'l Econ. L.

[Vol. 27:2

erbated by the intense credit crunch faced by SOEs, red chips, and
companies based in Guangdong in the wake of Guangdong International Trust and Investment Corporation's ("GITIC") 1998 collapse. 163 ZKG now found itself burdened with a very high debtasset ratio and numerous bad investments that had been hoisted
upon it by ZMG. It began defaulting on loan payments to the
banks in November of the following year. 64
By 1999, both ZKG and ZKHK had defaulted on nearly all of
their obligations from debt owed to their international bank creditors. 165 By the following year, 41% of ZKG's land assets were
pledged against bank loans, 166 as were 235.2 million shares in ZKD
owed by ZKG 167 to Chinese banks owed HKD 406 million.1 68 Also
in 2000, ZKG stopped making payments on its principal. 169 Finally,
in October 2004, after years of floundering and failed negotiations,
ZKG earned the ignominious distinction of being the first major
overseas investment company of a mainland government to be put
into liquidation by a Hong Kong court 170 with HKD 7.8 billion in
debt171 and only about HKD 4 billion in assets. 72 It had already

163 Vincent A. Pace, GuangdongInternationalTrust and Investment Corporation's
Collapse and Its Implicationsfor a China in Transition, 1 THE PHOENIX 43, 49-50 (2002).
Red chips are PRC-controlled, Hong Kong-listed companies, and often SOEs. Red
Chip,

INVESTOPEDIA.COM,

http://www.investopedia.com/terms/r/redchip.asp

(last visited Apr. 1, 2006).
164 Miller & Clifford, supra note 3.
165 RSM, supra note 37, para. 29.
166 Moir, supra note 45. Red chips are listed PRC SOEs. Notice of the State
Council Concerning Further Strengthening Administration of Issuing and Listing
Shares Overseas (promulgated by the State Council, June 20, 1997, effective June
20, 1997) ISINOLAw 229-134357 (last visited Apr. 1, 2006) (P.R.C.).
167 Christine Chan & Jane Moir, BOCHK Among Largest of Zhu Kuan's Creditor
Banks, S. CHINA MORNING POST, July 23, 2003, at 1, availableat 2003 WLNR 5930321.
168 BOC Hong Kong Among Zhu Kuan Group's Biggest Creditors - Report, AFX ASIA, July 23, 2003, available at LEXIS News & Business, Country & Region (excluding U.S.), Asia/Pacific, News.
169 Luck, supra note 74.

170 Moir, supra note 3.
171Id.; see also Moir, supra note 48 (noting that creditors of ZKG were "owed
about $8 billion").
172 Miller & Clifford, supra note 3; see also Interactive Currency Table, IECOM, at
http://www.xe.com/ict (last visited Apr. 1, 2006) (stating that the US$1 was
worth HKD 7.7659611244 as of December 1, 2003).
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faced similar results in both Macau and the British Virgin Islands
("BVI") 173
2.3.1. Signs of mismanagement
Most of ZKG's debts were incurred from numerous infrastructure projects in Zhuhai, 174 an ultimately unprofitable priority for
ZMG -largely forced onto ZKG. Moreover, "[a] substantial majority of the funds raised by [ZKG] in Hong Kong and Macau were
advanced to and invested in assets and projects owned, controlled
or promoted by ZMG." 175 Accordingly, the pattern of ZKG mismanagement followed the greater pattern of ZMG mismanagement; an optimistic prediction would be made for a speculative investment, and major losses would result. Just as it is difficult to
draw the line between ZMG and ZKG, it is also difficult to delineate between ZMG's poor policy and ZKG's mismanagement.
ZMG's various white elephants figure prominently in ZKG's financial difficulties. ZKG was usually directly involved in ZMG's
various projects, but even when not directly involved, ZKG had a
large indirect risk as ZMG's primary financier.
The list of botched plans is long. Assuming Beijing would approve the landing of international flights in Zhuhai, ZMG built the
RMB 6.9 billion Zhuhai "International" Airport that never got approval for international flights and now operates at only 5% capacity 17 6 with fewer passengers in a year than Hong Kong has in a
week. 177 Assuming funding to complete the thirty-kilometer' 78
Lingdingyang Bridge to Hong Kong, 179 ZMG ended up building a
173 See infra section 2.6.4. (discussing insolvency and the process of winding
up of companies in Hong Kong courts).
174 Moir, supra note 3.

175 RSM, supra note 37, para. 61.2.
176 Moir, supra note 63.
177 Sunil Jain, Hotel California, China, Bus. STANDARD, Aug. 23, 2004, availableat

2004 WLNR 4759747. Hong Kong's airport, within a two-hour drive from Zhuhai,
has exacerbated Zhuhai International Airport's problems by moving aggressively
to compete with the nearby Guangzhou airport, offering ferries direct to PRC cities and even considering a check-in center in the Pearl River Delta. Id. It seems
likely Beijing denial was a result of Guangzhou out maneuvering Zhuhai; Guangzhou itself recently opened its own white elephant airport that already has to
compete with Hong Kong and surely did not want additional competition from
nearby Zhuhai.
178 Luck, supra note 74.

179 See Moir, supra note 63 ("In the mid-1990s the government started work on
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RMB 17 billion bridge that has no roads connecting to either side of
0
it8 and ends at the minuscule Qi'ao Island just three kilometers
from Zhuhai. 181 Assuming Formula One would hold races at Zhuhai, ZMG built a state of the art racetrack but never succeeded in
drawing Formula One to the city.182 Assuming a continuing boom
in the real estate market, ZMG directed massive investment into
real property, only to now be met by a glut.183 Assuming good
visitor turnout, Zhuhai now has a range of under-visited tourist attractions and hotels with low occupancy rates.la 4 Assuming continuing steep rises in profits, ZMG approved ZHC's bond issuance
and ZKG backed it, but the profits failed to materialize. 185 Given
this pattern, it even seems likely that ZMG assumed it would get
the properties over which it is now involved in litigation with
86

ABC.1

ZMG also seemed to have assumed that it would be able to
raise further capital on the SEHK, only to have this too foiled by
Beijing. At the time of ZKD's listing in 1998, it was well known
that ZMG had long planned to group and list its infrastructure assets separately of ZKD. 187 However, the State Council issued regu-

the Lingdingyang bridge, which was intended to stretch from the Pearl River to
Hong Kong. It stopped short at Qi'ao Island."); Moir, supra note 3 ("[A] 17 billion
yuan bridge to Hong Kong now juts out as an abandoned stump.").
180 Leahy, supra note 1.
181 Miller & Clifford, supra note 3.
182

Id.

Moir, supra note 63. As a visit to any major PRC city can tell you, the rush
to develop real estate is widespread in the PRC, and seems to reach all the way to
the top:
183

[O]ne-sixth of the luxury residential real estate is vacant in Shanghai, a
quarter in Beijing, and a third in Shenzhen. And with banks lending
money for construction at government-mandated rates, which are much
lower than the inflation rate, the real estate bubble is only getting bigger
with each passing day. Experts predict the supply of office space will rise
50 per cent over the next couple of years, and the residential space even
faster.
Jain, supra note 177.
184 Moir, supra note 63.
185 See supra section 2.2.1.
186 See infra section 2.3.2.
187 Wong, supra note 73; see also Wong, supra note 47 ("It is understood that
the Zhuhai government plans to group its infrastructure business for a separate
listing.").
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lations regarding red-chip listings in June 1997 in an attempt to
reign them in.1 88 ZMG's plans ultimately fell afoul of Beijing's
tightening control of listings; 89 as of this writing, they have not
been able to list another red chip on the SEHK, increasing the pressure on ZMG's finances.
When ZKG hired Price Waterhouse Coopers ("PwC") to help
with restructuring in 2001, PwC calculated that ZKG would have a
US$2 million operating loss in 2002 even without making a single
payment to service any of its debt. 190 By September 2003, most of
ZKG's investments and trading businesses had terminated, curtailed, or postponed activities, 191 including the closing of a number
of ZKG subsidiaries in Hong Kong. 192 To rub salt in a wound, the
still-running tourism operations, like those of ZKD for example, received a sharp blow due to the SARS outbreak, 193 although the decline started well before the outbreak began. 94 By this point, there
Lai, supra note 59.
Notice on Certain Matters Concerning Further Perfecting the Foreign Exchange Control of Listing Abroad jointly issued by the State Administration of
Foreign Exchange and China Securities Regulatory Commission (promulgated
jointly by the State Administration of Foreign Exchange and China Securities
Regulatory Commission, Aug. 5, 2006, effective Sept. 1, 2006), available at IsINOLAW
278 -2003107 (last visited Apr. 1, 2006) (P.R.C.).
190 Miller & Clifford, supra note 3.
191Jane Moir, Zhuhai Government Sets Deadline for Zhu Kuan Creditors: The
Banks Have Until October 8 to Decide on Restructuring, S. CHINA MORNING POST,
Sept. 29, 2003, at 1, availableat 2003 WLNR 5959495.
192 Moir, supra note 3.
193 See Tam, supra note 50.
188
189

[ZKD] warned... that the outbreak of SARS may hurt their sales and
profits....
Zhu Kuan Development, which runs amusement parks and ferries in
Hong Kong and China, said its marine passengers, hotel occupancy rate
and visitors to its theme parks had plunged about 50 per cent since midMarch.
The company said the outbreak in Hong Kong and on the mainland
would have a negative impact on its financial position. It added that action had been taken to control spending, such as reshuffling employees'
schedules.
Id.
194 See, e.g., Timeline:
SARS Outbreak, CNN.coM INT'L, Apr. 24, 2003, at
http://edition.cnn.com/2003/HEALTH/04/24/timeline.sars/ (last visited Apr.
1, 2006) (dating the outbreak of SARS to February 2003); Zhu Kuan Development HI
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was no question that ZKG has suffered an utter and complete financial collapse.
2.3.2. Signs of involvement in illegal activities
While there is no smoking gun, various signs point to a tendency in ZKG to engage in certain illegal activities. ZKG was
caught at least once for breaking PRC regulations. During a PRC
crackdown on foreign currency flight, 195 three ZKD subsidiaries
were fined a total of RMB 7.75 million for breaking PRC foreign exchange regulations. 196 ZKG also faced the same allegation several
other times. ZMG rejected allegations that ZMG's Zhuhai Highway Company ("ZHC") US$200 million bond issue had breached
State Planning Commission ("SPC") regulations for overseas fund
raising, countering that the State Administration for Exchange
Control ("SAEC") approved the issue, that SPC was notified, and
97
that SPC had denied the allegations1
There were also allegations of ZKG involvement in a tariffevading smuggling operation. A report tied ZKG to a Fuji film and
photographic paper smuggling operation worth nearly RMB10 billion through a number of former employees and managers who
manipulated their connections with ZKG for their own benefit. Because much of the smuggling was done under the nose of ZMG via
customs in Zhuhai, it is not farfetched to posit that ZMG at the
very least turned a blind eye to the operation, although the report
Net Profit 4.808 mln HKD use 23.952 mln, AFX-ASIA, available at LEXIS News &
Business (excluding U.S.), Asia Pacific, News (noting, in the period from April to
October 2002, a HKD 19.144 million drop in ZKD net profits, a HKD 36.278 million drop in ZKD sales, and a HKD 186.72 million drop in ZKD operating profit);
Zhu Kuan Lower FY Earnings Due to Drop in Hotel Occupancy, Visitors Number, AFX
- ASIA, Aug. 29, 2002, available at LEXIS News & Business, Country & Region (excluding U.S.), Asia/Pacific Rim Archive News [hereinafter Lower FY Earnings]
(forewarning lower fiscal-year earnings because of decreased hotel market share,
lower prices and occupancy rates due to over-competition in the hotel market,
lower profit margins due to competition in ZKD-owned travel agencies, and
dropping numbers of visitors to tourist attractions due to poor weather and competition).
195 Beijing Acts to Stop Foreign Currency Flight, HONG KONG STANDARD, Sept.
30, 1998, available at LEXIS News & Business, Country & Region (excluding U.S.),
Asia/Pacific Rim Archive News.
196 Zhu Kuan Devt 3 Units Face Fines for Non-Compliance with Forex Rule in
China, AFX-ASIA, Dec. 11, 2002, available at Company LEXIS News & Business,
Country & Region (excluding U.S.), Asia/Pacific Rim Archive News.
197 Ma, supra note 89.
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did not implicate them directly. 198
At least one company sought to take ZKG to court for fraudulent misrepresentation. ABC claimed in a suit in Hong Kong's
High Court that ZKG has failed to carry out real estate development projects with money it had invested. ABC sought HKD 50
million in "damages for deceit or fraudulent misrepresentation,"1 99
that untrue contractual statements were made which induced the
bank's Zhuhai branch to invest. ABC said one project was never
completed, one property was purchased for just HKD 5 million,
and a third property was never owned by ZKG and thus could not
be developed.

20 0

2.3.3. ZKG's creditors
ZKG owed a total of HKD 7.8 billion 201 to forty-two international creditor banks.202 The largest creditor was believed to be
BOC, owed an estimated HKD 2 billion.20 3 BOCM was owed HKD
1.6 billion, making it the second largest creditor, and DBL was
20 4
owed HKD 536 million, making it the third largest creditor.
20 5
Other creditors included ABN
ZKG owed SCB HKD 181 million.
2 7
2
Bank of
AMRO, 06 Australia and New Zealand Banking Group,
210
208
(Asia),21 '
ICBC
BOCHK,209 Credit Agricole Indosuez,
America,
198 Fuji DistributorResponds to Smuggling Allegations, Bus. DAILY UPDATE, Jan.
22, 2003, at 22, availableat LEXIS News & Business, Country & Region (excluding
U.S.), Asia Pacific, News, Asia/Pacific Rim Archive News; Smuggling Scandal Hits
Fuji Film, Bus. DAILY UPDATE, Jan. 14, 2003, at 14, availableat LEXIS News & Business, Country & Region (excluding U.S.), News & Business, Country & Region
(excluding U.S.), Asia/Pacific Rim Archive News. It is not clear why the report
was created or who financed it. Ma, supra note 89.
199Daniel Hilken, Zhuhai City Unit Hit with $50m Suit, THE STANDARD, Sept.
16, 2004, availableat 2004 WLNR 11912469.
200 Id.

201 Moir, supranote 3; Moir, supra note 48.
202 Tim LeeMaster, Zhu Kuan Creditors Accept $3B, THE STANDARD, July 29,

2005, available at 2005 WLNR 11969858; RSM, supra note 37, para. 29.
203 Moir, supranote 48.
204 Id.

205
206
207
208

Moir, supranote 8.
Jain, supra note 177.
Wong, supra note 73.
Moir, supra note 38.

209 Chan & Moir, supra note 167.
210 Adam Luck, Madam Ding's Amazing Takeaway: China Is Not a Placefor the
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Lehman Brothers, Morgan Stanley, 212 Socit6 G~n(rale, 213 and the
214
well-connected Macau-based Tai Fung Bank.
These international investors found themselves pitted against
not only each other as creditors, but more formidably against wellconnected Chinese banks, as well as other creditors. All Chinese
banks were able to obtain secured debt, meaning higher priority
amongst creditors in case of bankruptcy, while foreign banks were
left with the unsecured debt. 215 BOC, for example, was able to secure their position by receiving a pledge from ZKHK for a 29.5%
share of ZKD stock. 216 Each time a new creditor was able to secure
its position, the remaining unsecured creditors were forced to fight
over a smaller and smaller pie. Moreover, the banks were not the
only ZKG creditors. There were several disputed liabilities between ZKG and ZMG itself as well as between ZKG and ZMGcontrolled enterprises. 217 ZHC bondholders at the time continued
to hold debt from the bond issuance. 218 ABC had a pending HKD
50 million claim. 219 If you extend the economic analysis of ZKG to
include ZMG, ZMG holds further debts to a large number of institutions in the PRC, making ZKG payment that much more complicated.
2.4. Pre-LiquidationNegotiations
2.4.1. ZMG's 2002 offer
ZMG, represented by Xian, began talks with creditors in approximately September 2000.220 These talks culminated in an offer

Unwary Businessman, as an Electrifying Court Case in Hong Kong Shows, THE SUNDAY
TELEGRAPH (LONDON), Apr. 4, 2004, at 1, availableat 2004 WLNR 4128432.

Moir, supra note 38.
Luck, supra note 210.
213 Moir, supranote 38.
214 See Chan & Moir, supra note 167 (ascribing control of Tai Fung Bank to the
family of Macau Chief Executive Edmund Home Hau-wah).
215 Leahy, supra note 1; see also Chan & Moir, supra note 167 (noting that
BOCHK has secured their position).
216 Wong, supra note 141.
217 See infra section 2.5.
218 See supra section 2.2.
219 Hilken, supra note 199.
220 Moir, supra note 3; RSM, supranote 37, para. 29.
211

212
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that would have given creditors from 40%221 to 61%, depending on
the class of their loans, 222 through payments including a RMB 1.5
billion cash commitment from ZMG 223 and the proceeds of the
later-disputed Hengqin and Tangjia land plots. 224 Creditors, having a good sense of just how big a hole ZKG now found itself in,
readily accepted this offer in June 2002.225
By January 2003, ZMG was seeking more time, allegedly in order to obtain funds.226 Creditors response to this was to up the
ante and demand 45% for unsecured creditors. 227 In April 2003,
creditors gave ZKG legal notice demanding their money after
ZMG failed to implement restructuring as per their offer. 2 8 A far
cry from 45%, ZMG ultimately completely reneged on the 2002 offer, saying only that it "didn't make sense financially" for ZKG. 2 9
2.4.2. ZMG's 2003 offers
In June 2003, ZKG made a new offer 230 that would have given
unsecured creditors a return of just 18%.231 This was unanimously
rejected 232 and criticized as "derisory." 233 After a month of no progress, SCB served a statutory demand on ZKG in Hong Kong for
234
repayment on the loans due to SCB in preparation for litigation.
The payment never came. In August, after obtaining a new loan
from a mainland commercial bank with ZMG's assistance, ZKG
made a revised offer of 21% but most creditors rejected this as
well. 235 Creditors questioned whether ZKG could afford even this

221 Moir, supra note 191.
222 Moir, supra note 48.
223 Moir, supra note 3.

224 Miller & Clifford, supranote 3.
225 Moir,supra note 3.
226 Id.

227 Chan & Moir, supra note 167.
228 Miller & Clifford, supranote 3.
229 Id.

230 Re ZKG 2004, supra note 39, para. 6.
231 Moir, supra note 48; Moir, supra note 3.
232 Moir, supra note 48.
233 Id.
234 Re ZKG 2004, supra note 39, para. 6.
235 Moir, supra note 191.
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offer 236 while at the same time questioning whether there was more
to be had. As one source close to the creditors said, "[t]here's nothing to prove to us that 21 cents is the best offer. The bottom line is I
don't think we trust them." 23 7 With no acceptable explanation of
the drastic reduction in offer price ever given, creditors had little
choice but to assume the worst.
2.4.3. ZMG's attempt at pressure tactics
After creditors had rejected the second 2003 offer, ZMG attempted to use pressure tactics to convince creditors to accept the
21% settlement. They began softly, with statements such as, "[t]he
present bailout proposal is the best we can offer to creditors. We
hope they all will accept it .... Creditors should approach the issue calmly and intelligently." 238 But then ZMG adopted an ultimatum, informing creditors that it would withdraw all support from
ZKG unless creditors accepted a restructuring offer by October 8,
2003.239 It said that 21% "reflected the maximum support the Zhuhai municipal government can afford" and Wang, in a letter to
SCB, said, "should [this] final offer not be accepted, the Zhuhai
municipal government would have to withdraw all support to the
companies and accept that they will be liquidated." 240 Finally,
ZKG became more blunt: "The Zhu Kuan Group maintains that its
most recent offer... should be accepted by creditors because it
would provide a better return than liquidation." 241 About 20% of
ZKG's creditors accepted this offer, including secured creditor
BOCHK, while only 5% of ZKHK's creditors accepted it,242 possibly
reflecting a belief by ZKHK's creditors' that they would have fewer
difficulties in getting a higher return from Hong Kong-based assets. In any case, those that called ZMG's bluff would ultimately
be rewarded down the line.

Miller & Clifford, supra note 3.
Jane Moir & Christine Chan, Zhu Kuan Returns to Debt Talks; The Zhuhai
Government Raises its Cash Settlement Offer but Creditor Banks Remain Unimpressed,
S. CHINA MORNING POST, Aug. 30, 2003, at 1, available at 2003 WLNR 5887638.
238 Id.
236
237

239

Moir, supra note 191.

240

Id.

241

Miller & Clifford, supra note 3.
Moir, supra note 191.

242
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2.4.4. Creditors' changing strategy
Creditors had initially negotiated one-on-one with ZKG and
banned together only after this proved utterly ineffective. 243 Creditors had begun negotiations with the hope that a massive government bail out was in line for ZKG.244 As this hope proved to be unfounded, they turned their hope to a settlement, under the
assumption that ZMG wanted to avoid the pending public fight
which was sure to be bitter, and would cast a negative light on
ZMG, 24 5 to damage their future borrowing potential, and to possibly expose ZKG directors to potential criminal liability. There was
also a broad assumption that, without a settlement involving assistance from ZMG, the creditors would ultimately fare even worse
246
than otherwise.
Creditors sought to have Beijing and Guangdong bear down on
ZMG, 247 and there is little doubt that ZMG had thought about these
areas already. Although Beijing essentially told Guangdong and
Zhuhai to resolve things on their own, 248 the ultimate result seems
to have been that higher-ups avoided the dispute altogether, at
least in public.
Creditors viewed liquidation as the unavoidable final resort after these protracted talks, 249 but nevertheless hoped that litigation
would push ZMG and ZKG back to the negotiating table.250 Creditors also expressed the desire to know what would happen to the
funds in the event of liquidation. 25 ' However, the bottom line remained getting back as much money as possible and a settlement
was held throughout to be the best way to do this.

Re ZKG 2004, supra note 39, para. 4.
Moir, supra note 3.
245 Id.
246 Wong, supra note 73.
247 See Moir, supra note 45 ("The provisional liquidators will seek assistance
from officials in Beijing.").
248 Interview with Hubert Lam, Senior Manager, RSM Nelson Wheeler Corporate Advisory Services Limited, Neil E. McDonald, Partner, White and Case
LLP, and Kelly Naphtali, Associate, White and Case LLP, in Hong Kong, China
(Jan. 11, 2005) (notes on file with author) [hereinafter Interview].
249 Moir, supra note 3.
250 Miller, supra note 4.
251 Miller & Clifford, supra note 3.
243
244
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2.5. Dissipationof ZKG's Assets
It was only after ZKG was declared bankrupt in Hong Kong
that RSM discovered that the vast majority of ZKG assets were
from land interests in Zhuhai and accounts receivable from entities
in Zhuhai, nearly half received from ZMG.252 Much of the land interests had been transferred to ZKG from ZMG in an effort to bolster ZKG's balance sheet, a common and legal practice among PRC
municipalities and their SOEs.253 By 2001, more than 90% of ZKG's
assets were property-related and more than half of that was undeveloped land in Zhuhai 254 for which ZKG held commercial or industrial use rights. 255 From the start of negotiations, creditors
feared that "there could have been a transfer of assets by the group
to the detriment of the creditors." 256
These fears proved all too correct. 257 According to creditors,
"[ZMG] want[ed] to take the prime assets," 258 engaged in systematic
asset-stripping, 259 and was "always three steps ahead" of creditors'
actions to protect ZKG's assets.260 ZMG seemed prone to use underhanded means, prompting Borrelli to say, "[t ]his sort of behavior
for anywhere in the world is just disgraceful, but to have a government also participating in that kind of behavior is just unreal." 261
For their part, ZMG categorically denied asset-stripping. Liu said,
"[ojutside parties have questioned whether there is now a plan to
strip Zhu Kuan assets ....This is an accusation completely without
merit and is also irresponsible." 262 Overall, ZKG and ZMG's excuses
for the asset transfer cannot be justified in light of the given facts.
252 Jane Moir, Receivers Find $ lOb Zhu Kuan Assets; Recovery of the Money from
the Companies Controlled by the Zhuhai Government is Unclear as it is Tied Up in Land,
S. CHINA MORNING POST, Oct. 15, 2003, at 3, available at 2003 WLNR 5993101.
253 Miller & Clifford, supra note 3. In 1998, after financial difficulties had begun, ZMG transferred $423 million in real estate assets to ZKG and later an additional $89.5 million. Id.
254 Id.
255 Re ZKG 2004, supra note 39, para. 5.
256 Moir, supra note 4.
257 Moir, supra note 51.
258 Jane Moir & Bei Hu, Creditors Accuse Zhuhai Government of Asset-Stripping,
S. CHINA MORNING PosT, Aug. 15, 2003, at 1, availableat 2003 WLNR 5850568.
259 Miller, supra note 4.
260 Moir, supra note 3.
261 Moir, supra note 51.
262 Miller & Clifford, supra note 3.
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2.5.1. ZMG's debt to ZKG
RSM discovered that HKD 4 billion of HKD 7.8 billion debt
went directly to ZMG 263 for unspecified purposes, 264 all of which
was still owed to ZKD.265 These loans were used for development
and on property nominally owned by the window company, but a
sizeable portion of the cash also went right to ZMG for its own projects, 266 including an array of ZMG-affiliated entities such as the
Library of Zhuhai Municipality, Labor Union of Zhuhai Municipality, and Zhuhai Television Station.267 RSM found no debts whatsoever that ZKG owed to ZMG, despite ZMG alleging such debts
268 One
without actually providing any evidence of their existence.
example of such debts was an alleged liability to ZMG of HKD 741
million that was suspiciously "overlooked" and suddenly brought
to light at a later point. According to sources close to the creditors,
ZKG transferred land rights to ZKD in order to raise extra funds
but neither the asset nor the liability were entered into ZKD's accounts, leaving HKD 741 million due to the government. Unsurprisingly, creditors demanded documents relating to the transfer
and an explanation as to why it was "overlooked." 269 It ultimately
appears that no explanation was ever given and this issue remained unresolved until the final settlement rendered it moot.
2.5.2. ZKG's forfeiture of land-use rights to ZMG
Under PRC law, all land is owned by the state and those using
270 LAL
the land are merely granted land-use rights by the state.
271 ZKHK's
provides broad leeway for state requisition of land.
Moir, supra note 48.
264 Miller & Clifford, supra note 3.
265 Moir, supra note 52.
266 Moir, supra note 51.
267 RSM, supra note 37, para. 188.
268 Moir, supranote 51.
269 Chan & Moir, supra note 167.
270 See Land Administration Law of the People's Republic of China, (promulgated by the Standing Comm. People's Cong. Beijing Mun., Jan. 1, 1999), available
at ISINOLAW 291-11531 (last visited Apr. 1, 2006) (P.R.C.) [hereinafter LAL] ("The
People's Republic of China practices socialist public ownership of land, namely,
ownership by the whole people and collective ownership by the working people.
Ownership by the whole people means that the right of ownership in State-owned
land is exercised by the State Council on behalf of the State.").
271 Id., at art. 2, para. 4 ("The State may, in the interest of the public, lawfully
263
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ownership of land in the PRC would have been recognized with
the provision of the necessary paperwork, including the land use
right certificates. 272 However, from the beginning, creditors were
wary of using ZKG's land-use rights due to ZMG's ultimate own273
ership of the land as the relevant state actor.
Creditors' reservations would ultimately prove to have been
well founded. During restructuring negotiations in 2002, both
ZKG and ZMG repeatedly assured creditors that, as per an agreement between the parties, mortgages for the benefit of the creditors
would be taken out on several properties. These, however, were
never executed. 274 In July 2003, just one day before Xian met with
creditors to explain why the 2002 offer had been withdrawn, ZMG
took advantage of the law to take from ZKG the land-use rights on
two plots of land in Zhuhai 275 that were considered some of ZKG's
prime land assets. 276 They asserted that these transfers were within
their rights and simply "a matter of zoning regulation," 277 "a routine city-planning exercise," 278 or "part of legitimate change in
Zhuhai planning policy." 279 The plots, totaling more than 100 hectares,280 included a Hengqin site worth RMB 320 million -the pro281
posed site of one end of the Hong Kong-Zhuhai-Macau bridge
requisition land owned by collectives."); id., at art. 45, para. 3 (requiring the approval of only local people's governments for non-agricultural land requisition of
less than 70 hectares); id., at art. 47, para. 3 (letting local governments set compensation rates for non-cultivated land).
272 See LAL, supra note 270, at art. 11 (requiring the government to issue land
use right certificates); Regulations for the Implementation of the Land Administration Law of the People's Republic of China, Jan. 1, 1999, ISINoLAw 76613, 29111528 (last visited Apr. 1, 2006) (P.R.C.) (describing the means by which land use
right certificates are issued).
273 Moir, supra note 4.
274 RSM, supra note 37, para. 204.
275 Moir, supra note 3.
276 Miller & Clifford, supra note 3.
277 Moir, supra note 252 (internal citations omitted).
278 Miller, supra note 70.
279 Miller & Clifford, supra note 3.
280 Id.
281 Moir, supra note 52. By March 2005, the PRC had given its approval to begin construction of the bridge. However, despite ZMG promoting Hengqin,
Gongbei was selected instead as the landing site for the bridge in Zhuhai. See
Bridge Task Force Site for Inaugural Talks, NEWS GUANGDONG, Aug. 29, 2003,
http:/ /www.newsgd.com/specials/gdandcepa/projects/200308290018.htm
("Zhuhai Executive Vice Mayor Xian Wen said... that Zhuhai preferred the

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol27/iss2/5

2006]

ZHU KUAN GROUP BANKRUPTCY

and a Tangjia site28 2 worth RMB 691.5 million.283 Despite ZKG's
knowledge of the transaction 28 4 and their meeting with creditors on
the next day, neither ZKG nor ZMG informed creditors of these
forfeitures, 28 5 seemingly running afoul of LAL. 2 86 Creditors were
not informed of these transactions until a routine land search during August 2003.287 These rights originally were to be sold to meet
the cash requirement of the 2002 offer and their forfeiture was a
major issue as to why ZKG could not hold up its end of the bargain. 288 ZMG never provided any compensation for these sei289
zures.
ZKG was entitled to appeal this decision 290 or to request to
compensation for these forfeitures, 2 91 but it failed to do either 292 despite promises to "challenge the forfeiture ...and to seek substantial compensation." 293 ZKG subsequently informed creditors that
they would "ask the Zhuhai government to change its mind," but
bridge to extend to Hengqin Island ....
");Leu Siew Ying, HK Landing Picked for
Delta Bridge, SKYLINE NEWS UPDATE, Jan. 12, 2005, http://www.skylinetechnologies.com/news/0105/120105.htm (describing the three options for where
the bridge could land in Zhuhai); Xiangzhu'ao Daqiao Xi'an Luojiao Gongbei You
Wang [There Is Hope for Hong Kong-Zhuhai-Macau Bridge's Gongbei Western Landing],
ZHONGGUO CHUANG [CHINA WINDOW NET], Mar. 4, 2005, http://www.cnwnc.
com/20050304/ca1463504.htm (reporting that Zhuhai has conditionally accepted
Gongbei as the landing point of the bridge).
282 Moir, supra note 3.
283 Re ZKG 2004, supra note 39, para. 8.
284 Wong, supra note 73.
285 Moir & Hu, supra note 258.
286 See LAL, supra note 270, art. 46 ("[T]he requisition shall ...be announced
by people's governments ....
").
287 Moir & Hu, supra note 258.
288 Moir, supranote 3.
289 RSM, supra note 37, para. 206.
290 See Administrative Procedure Law of the People's Republic of China,
(Standing Comm. People's Cong. Beijing Mun., Oct. 10, 1990) ISINOLAW 24-131604
(last visited Apr. 1, 2006) (P.R.C.) [hereinafter APL]; see also infra note 490 (explaining why this dispute falls under administrative law within the Chinese legal system).
291 See LAL, supra note 270, art. 46 ("Units and individuals that own or have
the right to the use of the land under requisition shall, within the time limit fixed
in the announcement, register for compensation with the land administration department of the local people's government by presenting their certificates of land
ownership or land-use right.").
292 Moir & Hu, supra note 258.
293 Re ZKG 2004, supra note 39, para. 8.
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294
predictably there was no change to the benefit of the creditors.
As Hengqin ultimately was not selected as the entry point in Zhuhai of the Hong Kong-Zhuhai-Macau bridge, 295 it seems likely that
the value of its land-use rights have declined significantly. As
"[1]and requisitioned shall be compensated for on the basis of its
original purpose of use," 2 96 and the potentially lucrative use for the
bridge was never more than speculative, 297 there is an argument to
be made that whatever compensation ZKG would have received
previously, however uncertain, has now been diminished. Thus,
assuming that ZKG gets compensated at all for ZMG's land requisition, ZMG will likely benefit from their earlier requisition by having to pay a lesser compensation than would have been the case
previously when Hengqin's future prospects looked more promising. While this could be chalked up to a stroke of luck, in light of
ZKG's other behavior it seems at least equally as likely that this
was strategic.

2.5.3. ZMG's seizure of additionalproperties
In addition to these forfeitures, RSM discovered a further HKD
298
50 million worth of properties that ZKG transferred to ZMG,
which included a site in Dongguan, a 70,000 square foot complex
in Zhuhai, and a number of residential sites, 299 which collectively
represented all of the remaining unencumbered real property of
ZKG. 300 These transfers were done pursuant to court orders fol3 1 none of
lowing applications filed by the ZMG Finance Bureau,
which were made known to the provisional liquidators until long
after the transactions had taken place, despite ZKG's claim of legal
title over the properties. 302 In contrast to the long delays creditors
Moir & Hu, supra note 258.
See supra note 281 (specifically the discussion of the Hong Kong-ZhuhaiMacau bridge).
296 See LAL, supra note 270, art. 78 (suggesting that if RSM can somehow succeed in making the difficult argument that this requisition was illegal, ZKG will
be entitled to compensation from ZMG, ZIC, or both).
297 See supra note 281 (arguing that the plan for the bridge was uncertain).
298 Moir, supra note 3.
299 Moir, supranote 51.
300 RSM, supra note 37, para. 202.
301 Id. para. 179.
302 Moir, supra note 52; Moir, supra note 51.
294
295
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faced in the PRC, these applications were accepted just three days
after they were filed.3 03 ZMG even kept ZKG in the dark about the
legal action to seize the properties until after the fact. 30 4 The
documents ZMG filed in ZIC alleged that the seizures would offset
debts that ZKG owed to ZMG,3°5 which appears to be a complete
306
fabrication.
2.5.4. PIV's pledging of ZKD shares to LSG
In 2000,307 two years after ZKG's financial troubles began and
by this point already grossly insolvent, ZKG transferred a HKD
250 million debt to BVI-registered LSG,308 a company ultimately
controlled by ZMG via JZPG but not part of ZKG,309 as part of a
deal with JZPG to share the sale proceeds of a 49% stake in Zhuhai
Ferry and of a 90% stake in ZJPPTS.310 When creditors discovered
this pledge-even before the appointment of the provisional liquidators 311 - they immediately demanded information on the underlying debt, suspecting that the share charge was "illicitly created." 312 ZKG, however, failed to provide details regarding any
liabilities secured by this share charge or demonstrating that the
mortgage was properly created,3 13 defending the pledges on the
grounds that they were for a mortgage on ZKG's debt to BVI.314
ZKG also had pledged 337 million SEHK-listed ZKD shares to
PIV. PIV had not yet been involved in the debt negotiations at the
time of the share charge.31 5 PIV was a wholly-owned subsidiary of
ZKG incorporated in BVI as an International Business Company on
April 6, 2000.316 The only material assets that RSM could find of
303
304
305
306
307

RSM, supra note 37, para. 180.
Moir, supra note 51.
Id.

See supra section 2.5.1.
Miller, supra note 70.

314

Chan & Moir, supra note 167.
RSM, supra note 37, para. 7.
Chan & Moir, supra note 167.
RSM, supra note 37, para. 45.
Hu & Moir, supra note 142; Moir, supra note 85.
Id.
Hu & Moir, supra note 142.

315

Id.; Moir, supranote 85.

316

RSM, supra note 37, para. 43.

308
309
310
311
312
313
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PIV in Hong Kong were the ZKD shares pledged to them by ZKG,
317
who was also the only creditor of PIV that RSM could identify.
Chart 2: PIV's pledges of ZKD shares

In turn, PIV charged these shares-a 42% stake at the time
worth HKD 118 million-to LSG 318 to help cover ZKG's HKD 250
million debt to LSG 319 on June 9, 2000.320 ZKG further charged its
100% stake in PIV to LSG, with the effect of expanding the pledge
to certain other assets outside of Hong Kong owned by PIV. 321 On
322
August 27, 2003, LSG attempted to enforce the share charge
without notifying RSM or PIV.323
On September 3, 2003, RSM was additionally declared the provisional liquidators of PIV.324 This allowed RSM to prevent enforcement of the share charge, keeping them under ZKG and ac317
318
319
320

321
322
323
324

Id.
Hu & Moir, supra note 142.
Chan & Moir, supra note 167.
RSM, supra note 37, para. 44.
Re ZKG 2004, supra note 39, para. 11.
Hu & Moir, supra note 142.
RSM, supra note 37, para. 45.
Id. para. 46.
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cessible to creditors. 325
Given ZKG's action regarding other debts, the excuse, "Gee, we
really wanted to pay back our debts" as their sole motivation for
the share transfer is quite a big pill to swallow. Most likely, the
operative factor for their behavior was to keep the shares under
ZMG's control and/or just blatant asset-stripping. The fact that
ZKD issued a plan that could have potentially been used to dilute
the stocks RSM was seeking to control only further justifies this
326
conclusion.
2.5.5. Transfer of proceedsfrom the sale of Lok Ma Chau land
The Lok Ma Chau property had an estimated value of HKD
45,000,000 and yet the Hong Kong government paid HKD
74,659,860 when it took possession of a part of the land. 327 RSM
was unable to determine how this price was set.328 However, such
a seemingly high price from the government should trigger skepticism given that Hong Kong legislator Lau Wong-fat was a majority
shareholder in Grand Gain, which benefited significantly from the
329
sale of the property.
From this sale, ZKHK received HKD 41,234,598.330 On December 4, 2002, Koo & Partners, acting on behalf of ZKG, informed
creditors that 90% of the net sale, or HKD 37,111,138, would be
placed in an escrow account at SCB or at a bank designated by
SCB. ZKHK would retain the remainder for operating expenses
but would not use it until ZKHK and the creditors' steering committee agreed on a budget. 331

325 Hu & Moir, supra note 142. See also Announcement, Zhu Kuan Development Co. Ltd. (Sept. 3, 2003), available at http://notice.singtao.com/ADMA
%5C0908%5Cepdf/EZhu%20Kuan0409.pdf (stating that PIV has not enforced the
charge without any mention of the attempt to do so or the or the reasons why it
could not); Announcement, Zhu Kuan Development Co. Ltd. (Sept. 9, 2003), available at http://notice.singtao.com/ADMA%5C0908%5Cepdf/Zhu%2OKuan%201
009.pdf (responding to reports in the media revealing that RSM blocked enforcement).
326 See supra section 2.2.2.
327 RSM, supra note 37, paras. 117-18.
328 Id. para. 118.
329 Id. para. 117.
330 Id. para. 118.
331 Id. para. 119.
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Nevertheless, the escrow account was never opened 332 and for
a time the HKD 41 million proceeds could not be accounted for at
all. 333 It ultimately was revealed that on November 11, 2003-just
three days after receiving the proceeds and nearly a month before
Koo & Partners spoke with creditors-ZKHK deposited the proceeds in a bank account held by a BVI-incorporated company
called Wonderful Idea Limited, which shared an address with a
ZKHK director and for whose bank account ZKHK Director Yu Jianhua was a signatory. On January 23, 2003, with authorization
from Yu Jianhua, Wonderful Idea Limited transferred nearly the
entire amount to Ka U Trading Limited, which shared the same office as ZKG in Macau. 334 The money was ultimately transferred to
335
Zhuhai beyond the reach of creditors.
The ostensible reason was again that this was in order to pay
off a loan.336 This rationale was later expanded to hold that ZKHK
owed ZKG and Zhu Kuan Group Holdings Company Limited.
Furthermore, there was neither an explanation for the debt nor
clarification as to the reasoning behind the transfer payment via
337
Wonderful Life Limited.
2.5.6. Other questionableasset dissipation
Evidence of further questionable asset transfers were abundant.
Accounting irregularities resulted in both assets and liabilities not
being included in ZKD's books.338 Company shares and cash were
stolen from Macau. 339 With ZKG's dealings regarding Zhuhai
Ferry already of a suspicious nature, 340 ZKD further raised suspicions as the proceeds from the sale of a 51% stake in Zhuhai Ferry

Id. para. 120.
Moir, supra note 3.
334 RSM, supra note 37, paras. 120-22.
335 Luck, supra note 74.
336 RSM, supra note 37, para. 121.
337 Id. para. 123.
338 See Moir, supra note 51 (stating that there is no record of government debt
owed by the Zhu Khan group).
339 Associated Press, supra note 2.
340 Id., at pp. 56-59 (discussing ZKG's transfer a HKD 250 million debt to BVIregistered LSG, as part of a deal with JZPG to share the sale proceeds of a 49%
stake in Zhuhai Ferry).
332
333
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went unaccounted for.341 ZKHK allegedly transferred HKD 37 million to uninvolved entities controlled by ZMG in 2003.342 Alleged
"discrepancies in accounting standards" brought an additional
HKD 20 million of liabilities onto ZKG's books shortly before the
first 2003 offer. 34 3 Additionally, ZKG spent money on a railway
344
but RSM was unable to track down the railway itself.
Creditors also faced asset dissipation among ZKG's subsidiaries, many of which involved Hong Kong legislator Lau Wong-fat.
China Point Finances Limited, in which ZKHK held a 9% interest,34 5 owed HKD 50 million to ZKHK but refused to pay. 346 After
receiving a statutory demand from RSM, China Point Finances
Limited transferred to a 99.9%-owned subsidiary, China Point
Stockbrokers Limited, four properties in Hong Kong.34 7 It was only
under threat of being appointed as provisional liquidators that
RSM was able to gain leverage to prevent the further dissipation of
assets in China Point Finances Limited. 348 Top Ease Limited, 60%
owned by ZKHK and 40% by Grand Gain, owed at least HKD 60
million to ZKHK and yet nevertheless paid HKD 5.7 million to
other entities controlled by Lau Wong-fat after it had become dormant in 1997. 349 In August 2003, long after financial trouble had
begun, ZKHK provided HKD 1 million to invest in building rights
licenses acquired by Goldwell Properties Limited, which was
owned by former ZKG directors and Lau Wong-fat, but never received any return for this investment3S0 Entities controlled by
Simon Tam received a pledge of land from ZKHK, allegedly as security for debts owed by ZKHK to entities controlled by Simon
Tam. 35 1 These debts were settled and nevertheless RSM struggled
to have this security released. 352
Moir, supra note 3.
Moir, supra note 252.
343 Moir, supra note 4.
344 Leahy, supra note 1.
345 Re ZKG 2004, supra note 39, para. 27.
346 RSM, supra note 37, paras. 128-29.
347 Id. para. 130.
348 Id. paras. 131-36.
349 Id. paras. 140-42.
350 Id. para. 144.
351 Id. para. 158.
352 Id. paras. 158-59.
341

342
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2.6. FurtherAggravating Actions
2.6.1. ZKG withholding information
RSM had extreme difficulties in obtaining ZKG books and ac34
counts, 3 53 describing the vast lack of information as "alarming." 5
Repeated demands for information were ignored or fulfilled inNearly all of ZKG's records from Hong Kong,
completely.
Macau, 355 and presumably BVI were "temporarily removed for accounting purposes" to Zhuhai by ZMG.35 6 In Macau, especially,
this was exhaustive; when the Macanese liquidator went to ZKG's
offices which occupied two entire floors of the Zhu Kuan Building,
not a single book, record or computer hard disk remained. 35 7 None
were produced until two ZKG directors were arrested in Macau,
and these were nevertheless insufficient. 358 There was also a complete dearth of data regarding PIV in Hong Kong, 35 9 suggesting
ZMG had purposefully removed those as well. Similar problems
360
were found in other subsidiaries.
When RSM went to ZKHK's registered office in Hong Kong,
three employees of ZKHK were found, the most senior of which
left immediately for Zhuhai. On the same day, and seemingly instigated by RSM's visit to ZKHK's office, other ZKG companies
denied access to books and records located in Hong Kong and in
353 Associated Press, supra note 2; Moir, supra note 48.
354 Jane Moir, Legislatorin Zhuhai Bankruptcy Row; Zhu Kuan Group Liquidators
Threaten Action to Get Its Books After Kuk Leader Fails to Hand Them Over, S. CHINA
MORNING PosT, Aug. 28, 2003, available at 2003 WLNR 5879768; HK-Listed Zhu
Kuan Development Meeting Denies Liquidators Vote-Report, AFX-ASIA, Sept. 26, 2003,
available at LEXIS News & Business, Country & Region (excluding U.S.),
Asia/Pacific Rim News, Current.
355 Leahy, supra note 1.
356 Miller & Clifford, supra note 3, at 49.
357 RSM, supra note 37, para. 67.
358 Id. para. 70.
359 Moir, supra note 85.
36 ABC claimed an interest in land that might have been Lok Ma Chau, but
no records of this were found in Tinson International Limited or in Ocean Time
Development Limited. RSM, supra note 37, para. 127. The records of Kong Zhu
Freight Piers Limited, 50% owned by ZKHK and 50% owned by Grand Gain, were
nearly all allegedly destroyed. Id. paras. 151, 155. Kuan Tat, 50% owned by
ZKHK and 50% by Simon Tam, sold off a property owned at Tuen Mun for HKD
6.9 million shortly after the appointment of the provisional liquidators without
informing RSM. Id. para. 156.
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some cases even tried to remove them from the registered offices. 361 These visits succeeded in getting only fifteen boxes of
books, hardly sufficient for a company with at least twenty-five
362
subsidiaries, not including the thirty-three subsidiaries of ZKG.
At ZKD, employees prevented RSM from accessing information
stored there, compelling RSM to hire security guards to prevent its
removal from the premises. 363 Indeed, RSM's initial efforts to recover the books and records on ZKG showed little success as the
majority of them had already been removed from Hong Kong to
364
Zhuhai by the time provisional liquidators were declared.
RSM served ZKG management with legal notices to hand over
books and records related to ZKG assets, but responses were slow
365
in coming, and the few records that did come were insufficient.
RSM succeeded in contacting only two directors in total, even
though ZKG had seven directors and ZKHK had four. 366 These di367
rectors, all located in Zhuhai, simply refused to supply anything,
claiming that they were unavailable because they had been removed to the ZMG Audit Department. 368 Later they claimed that
the appointments in Hong Kong and Macau were not recognized
in the PRC and thus they were not compelled to disclose anything. 369

ZKG's response to creditors protesting the lack of information
was to call for patience while evading questions of even whether
370
these records would ever be turned over to creditors.
2.6.2. ZMG denying access to ZKG-related public information
ZMG, for its part, refused to turn over or even allow access to

361 Id. para. 65.
362 Id. para. 67.

363 Id. para. 87.
364 Id. para. 33.1.
365 Zhuhai Officials Block HK$4b Probe of Assets: Liquidators of Municipal Firm
Denied Access to Company Records, Bus. TIMES SINGAPORE, Sept. 24, 2003, available at
LEXIS News & Business, Country & Region (excluding U.S.), Asia/Pacific Rim
News, Current [hereinafter Block Probe].
366 RSM, supra note 37, para. 63.
367 Block Probe, supra note 365.
368 Re ZKG 2004, supranote 39, para. 10.
369 RSM, supra note 37, paras. 64, 73-79.
370 Miller & Clifford, supra note 3, at 50.
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the records it controlled. 371 ZMG's Audit Department held and
denied access to a number of companies' accounts books.372 Records held by the Zhuhai Administration of Industry and Commerce and the Zhuhai Real Estate Transportation and Registry
373
Center were also withheld.
As much of ZKG's assets were real property in Zhuhai, RSM
found one of its largest roadblocks in ZLR. RSM first sent two letters to ZLR asking it not to allow any change in the registration for
any real estate owned by ZKHK and ZKG and also to notify RSM if
anyone attempted to change it after August 13, 2003. ZLR did not
respond and RSM resolved to visit ZLR.3 74 Upon RSM's first visit
to ZLR, officials initially said that there had been a computer
breakdown preventing them from accessing the records, even
though all other observable computers were working properly, before finally admitting that they had been forbidden to cooperate
with RSM. 375 This situation persisted for more than a year.376
Thereafter, ZLR banned and physically prevented RSM representatives from entering the premises, preventing RSM from conducting
company searches 377 and land searches on twenty-three properties
in Zhuhai. 378 ZLR also refused to reissue title documents for these
twenty-three properties 379 and would not supply any of the paperwork for the seizures of the Hengqin and Tangjia properties. 380
2.6.3. Third partieswithholding information
RSM also had significant difficulty in obtaining information
from third parties involved in the case. RSM accused PwC, a former adviser of ZKG and current advisor of ZMG holding various
ZKG data, of being less than forthcoming with information, following ZMG's explicit instructions. 381
Block Probe, supra note 365; Miller, supra note 70.
Moir, supra note 52.
373 RSM, supra note 37, para. 61.6.
374 Id. para. 170.
375 Leahy, supra note 1.
376 RSM, supra note 37, para. 171.
377 Moir, supra note 3.
378 Moir, supra note 51.
379 Id.
380 RSM, supra note 37, para. 206.
381 Moir, supra note 45; RSM, supra note 37, para. 90.
371
372
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In addition to PwC, RSM also had to rely on the courts to obtain additional records from Koo & Partners (who had been representing ZKG and then represented ZMG) and Chiu & Partners
(who represented ZKD). 382 Koo & Partners, at the behest of ZMG,
based its lack of cooperation on two legal principles. 383 First, it argued that the court had no jurisdiction to wind up ZKG since ZKG
was a foreign company. 384 Second, the jurisdiction of a court in the
liquidation of a foreign company is limited to ancillary liquidations
and thus the provisional liquidators only had power over assets in
385
Hong Kong and information related to activities in Hong Kong.
RSM asserted that Koo & Partners should have known this posi386
tion was without merit.
The Zhu Kuan mess even reached a member of the Hong Kong
legislature. Hong Kong Legislator Lau Wong-fat had previous
dealings with ZKG through Grand Gain, a Hong Kongincorporated company which has shareholdings in at least eleven
ZKG subsidiaries, and in which Lau is a major shareholder, 387 and
388
some of whose books and records Lau held in a warehouse.
389
RSM repeatedly requested that Lau hand over the information.
At first, he agreed, but said it would take time to retrieve the records from the warehouse. Later, he said he would only release
the information with the approval of ZKG's directors. 390 After Lau
failed to meet a final deadline, RSM was again forced to take legal
action.391
2.6.4. RSM's moves to compel disclosure
ZMG's intransigeance in providing information led RSM to
take action to compel disclosure. RSM initiated various legal proceedings in the PRC, 392 Hong Kong, Macau, and BVI. 393 RSM was
382
383

384
385
386

Id. paras. 80-86; Miller, supra note 70.
RSM, supra note 37, para. 83.

Id. para. 83.1.
Id. para. 83.2.
Id. para. 84.

388

Id. para. 90.
Moir, supranote 354; Moir & Chan, supra note 132.

389

Moir, supranote 354.

390

Id.

391

Id.
See infra text accompanying notes 451-463 (discussing RSM's legal woes in

387

392
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able to meet with success outside of the PRC, 3 94 but the litigational
difficulties in the PRC were significant. 395 This prompted RSM to
take measures outside of the court, and they began appeals to the
central authorities in Beijing.396 With the help of lawyers, they approached the trade offices, financial authorities, and corruption authorities. 397 Publicly, however, Beijing remained mum on the issue.

39 8

2.6.5. Delay tactics
Creditors hold strong suspicions that at least the latter part of
negotiation was nothing more than an endeavor to buy time to let
ZMG cherry-pick prime assets from ZKG. 399 After the 2002 offer,
ZMG offered to inject more prime parcels of land into ZKG, convincing creditors to wait patiently even as assets continued to dissipate before presenting them with the 18% June 2003 offer.400
RSM also considered the battles that it had to fight repeatedly to
obtain information disclosure as causing "prejudicial delays." 401
Delays were also rampant in the ultimate court proceedings in the
PRC.
2.6.6. Lack of cooperationfrom the directors of ZKHK and
subsidiaries
When RSM was appointed as the provisional liquidator of
ZKHK, it obtained the right to place two out of four directors on
the board of directors of each of four different PRC-based subsidi-

ZIC against ZLR).
393 See infra text accompanying notes 392-450 (explaining why creditors had
to file winding-provisions in Hong Kong, Macau, and the British Virgin Islands

["BVI"]).
394 See id. (stating the success of the liquidation of ZKG in Hong Kong,
Macau, and BVI).
395 See infra section 2.8 (discussing the Zhuhai Intermediate People's Court
favoring the government's interests over the interests of creditors).
396 Block Probe, supra note 365.
397 Id.
398 See generally Miller & Clifford, supra note 3 (discussing the general lack of
oversight of ZKG).
399
400
401

Moir, supra note 3.
Luck, supra note 74.
Moir, supra note 354.
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aries of ZKHK. RSM repeatedly requested a board meeting, but
the chairmen would not convene a meeting for any of the subsidiaries. Just as with the production of information, directors were
not cooperative in these matters. 402 This would ultimately lead to
legal proceedings in the PRC.
2.7. Litigation in Hong Kong, Macau, and BVI
Despite the meeting on the next day, the discovery of the land
forfeiture and ZKG's lack of disclosure shattered whatever remaining trust creditors had in ZKG and ZMG to negotiate in good
faith,403 and the other various aggravating actions only served to
cement that belief. 404 As one source close to the creditors put it,
"We think [their actions are] disgraceful and insulting. Where did
the money go?.. . This really is an absolute joke. They're negotiating in very bad faith." 405 ZMG, unsurprisingly, denied it was obstructing a settlement, 40 6 but this was hardly enough to stop litigation from proceeding. Unfortunately for ZMG, the creditors found
powerful allies in the courts outside of the PRC.
2.7.1. Hong Kong
ZKG was incorporated in Macau. Thus, it would seem logical
to begin litigation there. Macanese courts claim sole jurisdiction
over the liquidation of companies incorporated locally, thus legal
action in Macau was inevitable as soon as the creditors decided to
take the litigational route. The problem with legal action in Macau,
however, was its lack of pre-liquidation asset protection. Instead,
Macau relies heavily on post-liquidation claw-back measures,
which would give ZKG ample time to strip assets to whatever extent possible. With books and records held by ZMG and ZKG officers, avoiding Macau claw-back measures would have been of only
40 7
very limited effectiveness.
RSM, supra note 37, para. 165.
Re ZKG 2004, supra note 39, para. 9.
404 See Moir, supranote 38 ("According to a letter prepared for banks by creditors, 'unfortunately, it has become clear that without transparency between the
parties, the financial creditors can no longer trust either the management of Zhu
Kuan or the Zhuhai municipal government.'").
405 Moir, supra note 4.
406 Miller & Clifford, supra note 3, at 20.
407 Kendall, supra note 65, at 41.
402
403
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The most promising alternative therefore was to begin legal efforts in Hong Kong, where courts could immediately appoint a
provisional liquidator to protect assets before bankruptcy was actually declared. 408 On August 12, 2003, creditors, led by SCB, did
just this, filing winding-up petitions against ZKG, ZKHK, and PIV
in Hong Kong 4°9 in order to seize and protect assets.410 Creditors'
main argument for liquidation was that ZKG was unable to meet
its obligations, 411 alone a grounds for liquidation under Hong Kong
law, 412 but also that ZKG was negotiating in bad faith, 413 appealing
to the courts' powers of equitable discretion to order liquidation. 414
On August 13, 2003, not even a full day later, and faced with overwhelming evidence, Hartmann declared Borrelli and Kennedy to
be ZKG and ZKHK's provisional liquidators in order to protect assets and begin investigations into ZKG. 41 5 This order, however,
was subject to recognition in other jurisdictions. 416 Less than a
month later, on September 3, Kwan issued the same ruling with re417
spect to PIV.
After being declared provisional liquidators, RSM could begin
its attempts to secure and claw back the assets of these and other
408 Companies (Winding-Up), Ch. 32H, Rule 28, June 30, 1997, at
http://www.legislation.gov.hk/BLISIND.nsf/ElBF50C09A33D3DC48256484001
9D2F4/1508BAC253568DF5C82564800043282F?OpenDocument (last visited Apr.
1, 2006).
409

Moir, supra note 3.

410

Moir, supra note 48; Moir, supra note 51; RSM, supra note 37, para. 32.

411

Miller, supra note 70.

See Companies Ordinance, Ch. 32, sec. 327(3), Feb. 13, 2004, at http://
www.leisltion.gov.hk/BLISIND.nsf/EBF50C09A33D3DC482564840019D2F4/25
50ACB6A9B83D2648256E3C00285B4D?OpenDocument (last visited Apr. 1, 2006)
[hereinafter Companies Ordinance] ("The circumstances in which an unregistered
company may be wound up are as follows ...(b) if the company is unable to pay
its debts .. ").One definition of inability to pay debts under 327(4) is failure to
make payment within three weeks after a statutory demand. Id. at sec. 327(4).
Anticipating litigation, SCB had issued just such a demand. See supra section
2.4.2.
412

413

Miller, supra note 70.

See Companies Ordinance, supra note 412, at sec. 327(3) ("The circumstances in which an unregistered company may be wound up are as follows... (c)
if the court is of opinion that it is just and equitable that the company should be
wound up.").
415 Re ZKG 2004, supra note 39, para. 10.
416 Kendall, supra note 65, at 41.
417 Re ZKG 2004, supra note 39, para. 11.
414
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ZKG subsidiaries in Hong Kong as well as begin its investigations
into ZKG's records and books.418 As RSM worked at this, hearings
related to ZKG's liquidation continued in October 2003, November
2003, January 2004, and April 2004.419 In these hearings, HKHC
consistently handed meaningful victories to RSM, even as RSM
took advantage of its powers as provisional liquidator. RSM was
able to finally compel the release of documents from PwC, Koo &
Partners, Chiu & Partners, Lau Wong-Fat, and Grand Gain with
the help of a court-approved s.221 application.420 RSM also quickly
421
succeeded in seizing ZKG assets still remaining in Hong Kong,

such as remaining land in Lok Ma Chau on Hong Kong's border
with the PRC valued at HKD 180 million, and land in Sai Kung and
Yuan Long.422 Barma was also flexible in permitting liquidators to

sell a number of assets. 423 At the last of these hearings, the extreme
difficulties RSM faced in conducting investigations, and the litigational difficulties in Zhuhai, 424 prompted it to file for and receive a
six-month adjournment from the HKHC in order to advance investigations and work on a settlement with ZMG.425 Reyes stressed
that the adjournment was exceptional and was being granted to allow the heavily delayed litigation in Zhuhai to proceed, but he
426
gave it to them nonetheless.
On November 17, 2003,427 ZKG attempted to strike creditors'

winding-up petition on jurisdictional grounds and forum non conveniens.428 Alternatively, ZKG sought to limit the liquidators' access to Hong Kong assets on the grounds that Hong Kong courts

418 Moir, supra note 52.

419 RSM, supra note 37, para. 34.
420 Id. paras. 93-100; see also Companies Ordinance supra note 412, sec. 221 (allowing the court to require production of any information from any person regarding a company in provisional liquidation or in bankruptcy).
421 Moir, supra note 48.
422 Id.

423 Zhu Kuan Co. v. Bridall, HCCL 42/1995 (H.K.H.C.), available at http://legref.judiciary.gov.hk/lrs/common/search/search resultdetail-frame.jsp?DIS=3
1930&QS=%28zhu%2Bkuan%29&TP=JU (last visited Apr. 1, 2006).
424 See infra section 2.7.2.
425 Miller, supra note 70.

Id.
427 RSM, supranote 37, para. 36.
428 Re ZKG 2004, supra note 39, para. 1.
426
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have no jurisdiction over assets outside of Hong Kong.429 Despite
hearings on the application to strike having finished on December
19, 2003, Barma did not hand down his judgment until July 13,
2004.430 This delay-leaving unanswered the question of whether
the court had jurisdiction and, by extension, whether RSM had any
powers at all -significantly impeded RSM's work during the period of the delay.4 31 In the end, however, Barma nevertheless rejected all of ZKG's objections and dismissed their application to
432
strike.
Finally, on October 4, 2004,4 3 3 after multiple hearings, six
months of judicial deliberation, 434 and the declaration of ZKG's
bankruptcy in Macau, 435 ZKG received the ignominious distinction
of becoming the first major investment arm of a mainland government to be declared bankrupt by a Hong Kong court. 436
2.7.2. Macau
Winding-up petitions in Hong Kong are nearly three hundred
times more common than in Macau. 437 Winding-up a company in
Macau is cumbersome, inflexible, and time-consuming, leading
companies to securitize their loans rather than rely on liquidation
proceedings for protection. 438 In Hong Kong, insolvency is presumed when a company cannot pay a statutory demand. 439 In
Macau, the claimant must prove insolvency by first showing a de-

429

Id.

RSM, supra note 37, para. 36.
Id. para. 37.
432 See Re ZKG 2004, supra note 39, paras. 16-69 (holding that jurisdiction is
proper and declining to restrict the provisional liquidator's powers to only assets
in Hong Kong as "an undue and unnecessary limitation on the functions to be
performed by a liquidator in an ancillary liquidation in Hong Kong"); Kendall,
supra note 65, at 41 (discussing the jurisdiction issue).
433 RSM, supra note 37, para. 39.
434 Kendall, supra note 65, at 41.
435 Wong, supra note 117.
430
431

436

Moir, supra note 48.

In 2002 and 2003, there were only ten winding-up petitions filed in Macau
compared to 2,853 filed in Hong Kong. Sue Kendall, Winding Up Macanese Companies in Macau-The Zhu Kuan Experience Brings Positive Development, OUT OF
COURT, Autumn 2004, at 3.
438 Id.
439 Companies Ordinance, supra note 412.
437
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fault of the company on at least one obligation and second that the
company cannot pay debts as they fall due. 440 Petitioners are not
permitted to introduce additional information after filing except in
exceptional circumstances. 441 Limitations of the Macanese legal
structure make the evidence-gathering process onerous; meanwhile creditors are potentially exposed to asset-stripping. 442 Macanese law relies strongly on claw-back provisions to recover dissipated assets. Unfortunately, such measures are unlikely to be very
useful in the case where assets have disappeared and books and
records are outside of Macau's jurisdiction.443
As Hong Kong winding-up orders are not recognized in Macau
and the Macanese courts claim sole jurisdiction over the liquidation of Macanese-incorporated companies, 444 creditors led by SCB
had little choice but to file in a liquidation petition for ZKG
Macau's Court of First Instance in March 2004.445 The delay vis-avis the Hong Kong filing was due to these differences in evidentiary requirements. Despite the high up front costs, the Macanese
liquidation proceeded rapidly once approved by the court, as it
does generally. 446 The petition for liquidation was filed on March
31, 2004. The hearings were in May; and just two weeks later, 447 on
440 C6digo de Processo Civil de Macau [Civil Procedure Law of Macau]
(2004), art. 308-10, available at http://www.imprensa.macau.gov.mo/bo/i/99/
40/codprcivpt/codprocivO3Ol.asp#13a389 (last visited Apr. 1, 2006); see also
Kendall, supra note 65 (describing the effect of this law).
441 Kendall, supra note 437, at 4.
442 The petitioner must evaluate the company's known assets and
liabilities. However, it is not possible to conduct a search of assets and liabilities by company name, despite the public record
office having details of them. The petitioner must also establish
what equity (if any) the company has in respect of its assets. This
is a burdensome and time-consuming process that will often rely
heavily on the information the debtor makes available to the petitioner. In the absence of pre-liquidation protection, assets remain
exposed to further dissipation while evidence is being gathered.
Kendall, supra note 65, at 41; see also Kendall, supra note 437 (detailing the cumbersome process of liquidation in Macau and its numerous pitfalls that leave creditors open to asset-stripping).
443 Kendall, supra note 437.
444 Id. at 5.

445 Miller, supra note 4.
446 See Kendall, supra note 437 (describing the general rapid pace of Macanese
liquidation litigation once the initial and substantial hurdles have been cleared).
447 Id.
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June 2, 2004, the court declared ZKG bankrupt.448 At the same time
the court appointed Wu Chun Sang liquidator in Macau. Wu
Chun Sang subsequently worked cooperatively with RSM to protect ZKG's assets. ZKG subsequently appealed the decision and
had yet to receive an answer as of November 2004. 449 However, a
favorable decision seems unlikely in the face of consistent court
rulings against ZKG and the broad mass of evidence against them.
Nevertheless, thanks to the bankruptcy declaration, creditors were
able to freeze ZKG's Macanese assets so they could only be disposed of by court order. 45 0 Similar to RSM in Hong Kong, Wu was
able to attach various properties and liquidate certain other as1
sets.45
Macanese courts also ruled in favor of creditors regarding the
gathering of information. After the court found out that no information remained in ZKG's office, it issued arrest warrants for the
directors of ZKG. When two of the directors entered Macau in July
2004, Macau's Immigration Department apprehended them and
sent them to the court. The court ordered them to produce the
books and records within two weeks from the date of their arrest.
Some books were produced, but proved to be insufficient informa45 2
tion for a company with dozens of subsidiaries.
2.7.3. B VI
In BVI, LSG petitioned the British Virgin Islands High Court of
Justice ("HCJ") to recognize PIV's share charge with no more
documentation than what had been provided in Hong Kong to
support the validity of the charge. 453 RSM naturally opposed this
454
and the validity of the share charges became the focal point.
LSG obtained an order from HCJ to serve notice of these proceedings to ZKG in Macau, seemingly in order to have the ZKG direc-

Associated Press, supra note 2.
Re ZKG 2004, supra note 39, para. 13.
Kendall, supra note 437, at 4. Among the assets shielded were the Zhu
Kuan Building and a HKD 230 million piece of real estate at Zone dos Novos
Atemos do Porto Exterior. Miller, supra note 4.
451 RSM, supra note 37, para. 105.
452 Id. para. 70.
453 Miller, supra note 70; see also supra sections 2.5.4-.6.
454 RSM, supra note 37, paras. 52-59.
448

449
450
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tors in Macau agree to a judgment in PIV's favor.455 RSM managed
to prevent this. LSG instead turned to delay tactics with repeated
applications for extension, frustrating RSM's efforts to take over
assets for the benefits of creditors and eventually garnering even
456
the anger of HCJ.
In response to LSG's legal efforts, RSM filed a winding-up petition for PIV in the BVI HCJ on September 3, 2003.457 At this point,
ZKG was not subject to liquidation proceedings in Macau-its
place of incorporation -and in Hong Kong; the court had thus far
only appointed RSM as provisional liquidators. The share charge
from PIV to LSG was still being contested in Hong Kong and had
been among the primary reasons for appointing provisional liqui458
dators in Hong Kong.
LSG filed a strike-out petition against RSM's petition. HCJ's
Justice Shanks was confronted with the question of whether the
court would recognize a foreign liquidation outside the law of the
locale of incorporation, the question, he noted, was "far from settled in English law." Shanks ultimately ruled that BVI did have
discretion to recognize such liquidation and that such discretion
considers whether the company under liquidation has sufficient
connections to the liquidating jurisdiction, the need for order, and
the principles of comity of nations. The incorporating locale's recognition or non-recognition of the foreign jurisdiction is an important but non-determinative consideration. Focusing strongly on
both RSM's actions to protect all creditors worldwide and the
Macanese liquidator's approval of RSM's actions, HCJ found that
these outweighed the fact that the liquidation had not been recognized in Macau and that, in BVI, RSM could act on behalf of ZKG
in regards to PIV. Shanks dismissed the strike-out petition. 459
This holding also stayed, but did not dismiss, all proceedings
regarding PIV pending the determination of the validity of the

455 Id. para. 55.
456 See id. para. 56 ("[U]nless [LSG] filed and served its Reply and Defense to
Counterclaims by 4.00pm on 6 October 2004, it would be barred from filing any
pleading and PIV and ZKG may enter judgment on their Counterclaims without
further notice.").
457 Id. para. 46.
458 Neil McDonald, Cross-Border Currents in Paradise,OUT OF COURT, Autumn
2004, at 6.
459 Id.
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ZKD share charges. 460 Nevertheless, the two sides came to what
was essentially a gentlemen's agreement to leave BVI aside in their
dispute, something possible only because ZMG did not believe it
461
likely that its tactics would ultimately succeed.
2.8. Litigation in the PRC
In addition to lack of provisions to protect assets pending liquidation, the liquidation process in the PRC is "time-consuming,
complex, and something of a lottery,".462 ZMG has effectively been
able to dictate ZIC's decisions regarding ZKG.463 As McDonald
elaborates:
The Zhuhai Intermediate People's Court has permitted the
Zhuhai government to seize assets which should be available for realization and distribution to all unsecured crediIt has ignored the provisional liquidators' requests
tors....
for assistance and it has actively interfered in the provisional liquidators' attempts to obtain redress against the
Zhuhai government. In simple terms, it has permitted the
government's interests to be preferred to the interests of
464
unsecured creditors.
2.8.1. Obtainingbooks and records in ZMG's possession
After ZLR barred RSM from conducting land searches on
twenty-three properties in Zhuhai, RSM initiated legal action
against ZLR in ZIC.465 PRC law mandates that "major" cases concerning foreign interests or the interests of Hong Kong and Macau
should go directly to the intermediate court of the relevant jurisdiction.466 ZIC, however, refused to accept jurisdiction on the grounds

461

RSM, supra note 37, para. 52.
Interview, supra note 248.

462

Kendall, supra note 65.

460

See Daniel Hilken, Rotten System Will Persist, Says Lawyer, THE STANDARD,
Feb. 14, 2005, available at 2005 WLNR 2078432 ("The mainland's legal system has
allowed domestic parties to make off with Zhu Kuan's assets, leaving foreign
banks, which are still owed around HKD 1 billion, without their rightful share.").
463

464
465

Id.
Moir, supra note 51.

466 Interpretation of the Supreme People's Court on the Execution of the Administrative Procedure Law of the People's Republic of China, art. 8 (Promolgated
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that "this case does not involve any substantial Hong Kong or
Macau issue." 467 ZIC completely ignored the foreign interests involved in the case and narrowly interpreted "major Hong Kong or
Macau issues" to exclude ZKG's bankruptcy. This holding begs
the question, if a HKD 8 billion conflict is not a major Hong Kong
or Macau issue, what type of matter between private parties are?
This interpretation is most likely erroneous, as the analysis of "major" focuses on both the political and economic impact of the
case, 468 and here the economic impact is undoubtedly very large.
ZIC transferred the case down to the district court in Xiangzhou. 469 The Xiangzhou District Court ("XDC") ultimately denied
RSM's request on the grounds that the creditors "failed to give
evidence confirming that it has any legal interest in the property." 470 XDC completely ignored RSM's arguments about the appropriateness of their jurisdiction over the case. 471 The logic
seemed to be that since the land no longer belonged to ZKG, and
the creditors had no claim against ZMG or the company that ZMG
subsequently transferred the land to, the creditors could not possibly have a legal interest in the property. 472 On appeal, ZIC ruled
that this was incorrect and remanded the case to XDC for further

by the People's Supreme Court Mar. 10, effective Mar. 8, 2000) ISINOLAW 1202000227 (last visited Apr. 1, 2006) (P.R.C.); see also, e.g., Rules of the Supreme People's Court on Several Matters Concerning the Jurisdiction over Actions for Civil
and Commercial Cases Concerning Foreign Affairs, arts. 1, 5 (Mar. 1, 2003)
ISINOLAW 120-330 (last visited Apr. 1, 2006) (P.R.C.) (holding the same for civil and
commercial cases); Provisions of the Supreme People's Court on Certain Questions Concerning the Hearing and Handling of International Trade Administrative Cases, arts. 5, 11 (promulgated Oct. 27, 2002, effective Oct. 1, 2002) ISINOLAw
120-360 (last visited Apr. 1, 2006) (P.R.C.)
The people's courts above the intermediate courts with competent jurisdiction shall hear and handle international trade administrative cases at
the first instance.... Where the parties concerned in the international
trade administrative cases involve parties from the Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region [or] Macao Special Administrative Region... the
cases shall be dealt with referring to these Provisions.
Id.
RSM, supra note 37, para. 173.
Id. para. 212.
469 Id. para. 173.
470 Jain, supra note 177.
471 RSM, supra note 37,para. 174.
472 Jain, supra note 177.
467
468
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473

proceedings.
In March 2004, RSM initiated separate proceedings in ZIC to
obtain the data held by the directors of ZKHK and its subsidiaries
in the PRC. In a relatively painless victory compared to its other
tribulations in the PRC, RSM convinced ZIC to order the directors
to produce such records as requested at the hearing in November
2004.474

2.8.2. Obtainingthe cooperation of the directors of ZKHK and
subsidiaries
In the same proceeding, RSM also sought to compel the cooperation of the directors of ZKHK and its subsidiaries in the PRC.
Despite the victory regarding the data, the court reserved judg475
ment in relation to such cooperation.
2.8.3. Challenging ZKG's forfeiture of land-use rights to ZMG
RSM began legal action to reverse ZKD's forfeiture to ZMG of
its rights on the Hengqin and Tangjia land plots in the fall of
2003.476 Problems began immediately. RSM's first step was to file
an administrative review 477 application in ZIC to appeal the decision regarding the Hengqin land plot as well as to address other
disputes with ZMG.478

The case was initially rejected on the

grounds that neither ZKG nor ZKHK had standing to complain in
relation to the seizures, 479 but was later accepted on the condition
that RSM pay RMB 8.77 million 480 in "court fees," 48 ' defended on
the grounds that the transaction was "a complicated case." 48 2 This

473

RSM, supra note 37, para. 176.

474
475

Id. para. 166-67.
Id. paras. 166-67.
Moir, supra note 3.

476

Block Probe, supra note 365.
Miller, supra note 4; Jane Moir, Mainland Sets High Pricefor Legal Recourse;
Liquidators Shelve Bid to Claim Disputed Land After Zhuhai Court Demands Eight Million Yuan in Fees, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Nov. 5, 2003 available at 2003 WLNR
5835367.
479 RSM, supra note 37, para. 207.
477

478

480

Miller, supra note 4.

481

Moir, supra note 478 (internal quotations omitted).
Miller & Clifford, supra note 3 (internal quotations omitted).

482
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served as an effective barrier to litigation.483
Historically, high court fees are one of the main ways PRC
courts have funded themselves, and are a regular feature of litigation in China 484 and are often prohibitive. 485 However, these court
fees are actually a misapplication of the law. Articles 5.8 and 5.4 of
the Measures on the Collection of Litigation Costs by the People's
Courts dictate that in bankruptcy cases where the bankrupt company's property value is greater than RMB 1 million, the court fee
may be up to 0.5% of this value 486 with a ceiling of RMB 100,000.487
The court has broad discretion to reduce or defer payment 488 and
489
the defendant will ultimately foot the bill if the suit is successful.
The court had initially miscategorized the case as a bankruptcy
case, applying the 0.5% rate for court fees and blatantly ignoring
the RMB 100,000 ceiling, when in fact it was an administrative
case. 490 Moreover, it applied this rate and ignored the ceiling de-

483

Moir, supranote 478.

484 Id. See also Measures on the Collection of Litigation Costs by the People's

Courts, Supreme People's Court, July 12, 1989, http://www.people.com.cn/
zixun/flfgk/item/dwjjf/falv/9/9-1-1-6.html [hereinafter Measures] (last visited
Apr. 1, 2006) (specifying the various fees to be paid in civil litigation).
485 See Walter Hutchens, Private Securities Litigation in China: Material Disclosure About China's Legal System?, 24 U. PA. J.IN'L ECON. L. 599, 652 n.207 (2003)
(discussing court fees' prohibitive effect in PRC securities litigation); Note, Class
Action Litigation in China, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1523, 1534 (1998) (discussing court fees
in PRC class action litigation).
486 Measures, supra note 484, §§ 5.4, 5.8.
487 See Supplementary Rules of the Supreme People's Court on the Measures
of the Collection of Litigation Costs by the People's Courts, Supreme People's
Court, art. 3.8 July 28, 1999) ISINOLAW 120-1999199 (last visited Apr. 1, 2006)
(P.R.C.) ("The litigation cost for a case on bankruptcy shall be collected as per half
of the standard for a property case on basis of the total property value of the
bankrupt enterprise. However, it shall not exceed a maximum of RMB 100000.").
4M Civil Procedure Law of the People's Republic of China, National People's
Congress, art. 107 (Apr. 9, 1991) ISINOLAW (last visited Apr. 1, 2006) (P.R.C.).
489 See Wenhai Cai, Private Securities Litigation in China: Of Prominence and
Problems, 13 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 135, 149 (1999) ("It is a general rule well recognized by Chinese courts that the losing party should pay the litigation costs, usually exclusive of attorney fees, of the prevailing party.").
490 Municipal governments are considered administrative under Chinese law
and thus the case regarding the Hengqin land plot against ZMG is administrative.
See, e.g., Diantou Longsheng Rock Materials Quarry v. City of Fuding,
CHINACOURT.ORG (Fuding People's Court, Apr. 11, 2002), at http://www.chinacourt.org/public/detail.php?id=17116 (last visited Apr. 1, 2005) (allowing an administrative suit against the City of Fuding). Moreover, APL aims to provide review of administrative actions by judicial organs. Conita S.C. Leung, Chinese
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spite being "resolutely forbidden" to do so by the Supreme People's Court, in a stem rebuke to all courts. 491 As an administrative
Administrative Law Package: Limitations and Prospects, 28 H.K.L.J. 104, 106 (1998).
Thus, even if ZMG were not a party, the case could be considered administrative
to the extent that the court's decision regarding the Hengqin land plot court order
is administrative. In turn, APL gives broad bases for suit, several of which could
be used to demonstrate that RSM's cases against both ZMG and ZLR are in fact
administrative. The relevant provisions are as follows:
The people's courts shall accept suits brought by citizens, legal persons
or other organizations against any of the following specific administrative acts:
(1) an administrative sanction, such as detention, fine, rescission of a license or permit, order to suspend production or business or confiscation
of property, which one refuses to accept;
(2) a compulsory administrative measure, such as restricting freedom of
the person or the sealing up, seizing or freezing of property, which one
refuses to accept;

(4) refusal by an administrative organ to issue a permit or license, which
one considers oneself legally qualified to apply for, or its failure to respond to the application;
(5) refusal by an administrative organ to perform its statutory duty of
protecting one's rights of the person and of property, as one has applied
for, or its failure to respond to the application;

(8) cases where an administrative organ is considered to have infringed
upon other rights of the person and of property.
Apart from the provisions set forth in the preceding paragraphs, the
people's courts shall accept other administrative suits which may be
brought in accordance with the provisions of relevant laws and regulations.
APL, supra note 290, art. 11. While arguments can be made variously for all the
above categories, Article 11(8) seems to be a catch-all that covers any action by
ZMG or ZLR that the creditors believed infringed upon their property rights, even
if not listed above.
491"I. It is imperative to implement law seriously.

II. It is imperative to forbid any and all random and indiscriminate collection of fees and charges. The people's courts shall collect the litigation
costs according to laws and rules, and any and all fees and charges without express stipulation shall be cancelled without exception.
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case, the applicable fee was at most a mere RMB 100.492
It is questionable whether this misapplication of the law was a
mere oversight by a careless judge 493 or a barrier thrown up at the
urging of ZMG.494 It is perhaps equally likely that the urging of
ZMG led a judge who was ignorant of the law to just follow ZMG's
prescriptions. RSM's initial reaction to the fee was to postpone the
litigation. 495 Their protests led the court to place the matter under
review. 496 In the end, the court ultimately reversed its initial decision and charged the correct statutory fee of RMB 100, in line with
497
all the relevant laws and regulations.
ZMG's tricks were not over yet. Once ZIC decided to accept
the case with the RMB 100 statutory fee, they immediately transferred the case to XDC. 498 As a result, the single appeal by right
would be to ZIC, a court where ZMG holds considerable influ-

1. The following fees and charges shall be forbidden resolutely:
a. Unreasonable fees and charges beyond the scope and standard stipulated by the Measures on Collection of Litigation Costs of the People's
Courts, Opinions on Issues in the Application of the Civil Procedure Law
of the People's Republic of China, Opinions on Issues in the Implementation of the Administrative Procedure Law of the People's Republic of
China (for trial implementation), Opinions on Issues in the Implementation of the Corporate Bankruptcy Law of the People's Republic of China
(for trial implementation).
Reply of the Supreme People's Court on Rectifying the Unhealthy Tendency of the
Loose Practice in Law Implementation and the Random and Indiscriminate Collection of Fees and Charges, Supreme People's Court, pt. I-I (Aug. 31, 1993)
ISINOLAW 77031-19932176 (last visited Apr. 1, 2006) (P.R.C.).
492 Measures, supra note 484, § 5.6.3.
493 See Moir, supra note 478 ("In the past, judges were predominantly partyappointed officials with little or no legal experience. While training on the bench
is now being promulgated, the new talent coming to the system is largely fresh
legal graduates. 'You see very young judges ....Can you rely on a fresh graduate from medical school?"'). See also id. (suggesting that courts outside of China's
flagship areas are unsophisticated and do not realize China's need to be open or
its need to enforce contractual rights).
494 See, e.g., Chris X. Lin, A Quiet Revolution: An Overview of China's Judicial
Reform, 4 ASIAN-PAC. L. & POL'Y J. 255, 298 (2003) ("[T]he judiciary is heavily influenced by local party and government officials who often abuse their power by interfering with the court's business.").
495 Moir, supra note 478.
496 Miller, supra note 4.
497 Id.
498 Id.
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ence. 499 After another legal battle, ZIC ultimately accepted to hear
the case, meaning the appeal would go to the Guangong High
Court ("GHC") in Guangzhou. 00 The applicable rule here was
again that major cases involving foreign or Hong Kong-related issues should start in the intermediate level rather than the district
level. Even once the case was accepted, problems continued in the
form of long delays. While the case was accepted and expected to
begin by May 2004,501 no trial date was set until September 16,
2004, despite numerous requests from RSM502 and the statutory
time limit of six months having already long passed. 503
At the hearing, ZMG's only defense was a familiar one: that
neither ZKG nor ZKHK had any interest in the land or any right to
commence legal proceedings. 504 In response to a range of evidence
submitted to the contrary by RSM, ZMG submitted that it had "no
comments and no objection." 05 In November, two ZKG subsidiaries-Zhu Kuan Property Development Company Limited and
Gongle New City Company Limited-that owned the said land
and were supposed to have been under RSM's control as liquidator, joined the proceedings and argued that RSM did not have any
rights to commence proceedings and that they did not wish to
commence proceedings against ZMG.06 Despite RSM's various
protests, the subsidiaries were permitted to join the proceedings5 07
and ZIC came down firmly on the side of ZMG, holding that ZKG
and ZKHK, as represented by RSM, failed to provide evidence
showing that the land was forfeited by ZMG and then dismissing
the case.508
RSM entered an appeal to GHC. In regards to the lack of evi499 See APL, supra note 290, art. 58 (granting the right to a single appeal at the
next higher level).
500 Mviller, supra note 4.
501

Id.

RSM, supra note 37, para. 215.
See APL, supra note 290, art. 39 (requiring a plaintiff to file a case with a
people's court within three months after finding out about the administrative act
in question); id. art. 57 (requiring a people's court to render a decision within three
months after the plaintiff files the case).
504 RSM, supra note 37, para. 216.
505 Id. para. 217 (internal quotations omitted).
502
503

506
507

508

Id. para. 219.
Id. para. 220.
Id. para. 221.
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dence that the land was forfeited, they stated that they had provided evidence from Ouyang confirming the forfeiture and, in any
case, ZMG had not contested or responded to any of the evidence
provided by RSM.50 9 Going back even farther, RSM pointed out
that ZLR had failed to allow RSM access to public information that
could have proved or disproved the forfeiture. 510 Finally, the subsidiaries refused to cooperate with the parent once under RSM's
control, and it was also obvious that ZMG wielded strong influence over ZIC.511 GHC had taken no action by January 2005.512
From the beginning, the prospects were slim that the land
would be returned for the benefit of creditors. In practice, PRC
governments' ability to revoke land-use rights functions is much
like U.S. eminent domain but with even less restrictions on what
the government can remove from SOEs. However, creditors' argument for compensation was at least marginally stronger. ZMG
can point to the fact that ZKD did not request compensation in the
statutory time period, but it is difficult to ignore the fact that this
would have been tantamount to ZMG requesting compensation
from ZMG. Being difficult to ignore, however, does not prevent
the PRC courts from ignoring it - as they in fact did - especially as
those courts were under ZMG's power.
2.8.4. ChallengingZMG's seizure of additionalproperties
On August 6, 2004, RSM filed an application in ZIC contesting
ZIC's decision to grant the ZMG Finance Bureau's petitions. On
November 25, 2004, ZIC unsurprisingly ruled against RSM, who
5 13
made immediate plans to file an appeal.
2.9. Intra-LiquidationNegotiations
In an attempt to bring ZKG out of liquidation in February 2005,
ZMG offered HKD 2.52 billion, a 21.33% return for unsecured
creditors.51 4 It was not clear where this money would have come
from, but ZMG said it would get a third party to provide the
509 Id. paras. 221.1.-.2.
510

Id. para. 221.4.

511 Id. paras. 221.3., 221.5.
512
513
514

Id. para. 222.
Id. para. 182.
Moir, supra note 48.
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cash. 515 Supposedly, ZMG signed a RMB 3.5 billion syndicated
loan agreement with the Guangdong branches of ICBC and
Guangdong Development Bank and the Zhuhai branch of the
SDB.516 If the creditors had accepted this loan, all claims against
ZKG would have been dropped, and assets secured against loans
to the banks would have been returned.5 17 However, the creditors
predictably rejected this offer, opting instead for further negotiations. 518 It was an open secret that the creditors were looking for a
return of at least 30%.519 Moreover, this offer gave unsecured
creditors barely 1% more return than the August 2003 offer of
HKD 2.25 billion that creditors had already rejected.5 20 Most
damningly, preparations for a counter-offer had already begun
when news of this offer hit the press. 521
2.10. FinalResolution
After the February 2005 offer, the Zhu Kuan case stepped out
of the media limelight and fell into quiet negotiations between
ZMG, ZKG, and the creditors. Creditors still held out for a settlement, including the blessing of higher governmental levels, as
meaningful legal remedy in PRC courts would have been costly at
best and impossible at worst. 522 Borrelli had even been hopeful for
a settlement by the end of 2004,523 although this did not come to
pass. The threat of liquidation loomed large over the creditors, 524
as liquidation without the cash infusion ZMG had been working to
provide would likely have made the end result for creditors worse
than even the most recent offer in February of 2005.
During 2005, the push for higher returns diminished to some
extent as more and more creditors sold their debt to other banks.
This took some pressure off of ZMG. These banks that bought the
515

Id.

516

Id.

Id.
Rejection of this was implicit in their acceptance of the July 2005 offer.
LeeMaster, supra note 202.
519 Moir, supra note 48.
520 Id.
521 Id.
522 Moir, supra note 3.
523 Id.
524 Block Probe, supra note 365.
517
518
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debt purchased at a discount and intended to make a profit off just
a few percentage points difference. DBL, for example, increased its
debt holding to HKD 536.3 million in January 2005, up massively
from HKD 74.1 million, betting - ultimately correctly - that the
5 25
price of the assets would rise.
But RSM had not taken any potential solutions off of the table.
Had negotiations failed, Borrelli was prepared to implement a "series of substantial legal steps," 5 2 6 and issued a warning to potential
third party investors that RSM was "certainly not going to let anybody take control of [the Hengqin land plot] until this dispute
[was] resolved," 527 a statement which could easily be projected
onto other the ZKG assets involved in the dispute. He further
stated that part of RSM's task ahead was to "ensure that both the
Zhuhai government and the officers responsible [were] brought to
account for what transpired before the appointment of provisional
5 28
liquidators and the assets that have been stripped away since."
One creditor has even specifically stated that "[u]ltimately, .... the
government will be pursued."52 9 Such threats against the government officials involved -especially in a China, where charges of
corruption could lead to a death sentence -carried significant
weight in pushing those involved to the negotiating table.
ZMG's asset-stripping, their previous threats of an impending
liquidation, and their poor financial status, as well as the case of
GITIC,5 30 suggested that ZMG's ultimate strategy might have been
525 Briefly: Korea Steel Maker Posts Jump in Profit, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Jan. 26,
2005, available at http://www.iht.com/articles/2005/O1/25/bloomberg/sxbriefs.
php (last visited Apr. 1, 2006).
526 Moir, supra note 3. See also Interview, supra note 248 (detailing accounts
by RSM and its legal counsel which describe actions similar to the previous case
of China Tianjin International Economic & Technical Co-operative Corporation, in
which a single disgruntled businessman entered judgments all over the world
against an SOE and ultimately compelled the SOE to meet his demands). For a
full discussion of the case, see Vincent A. Pace, FinancingChinese State-Owned Enterprises: The Lessons of Three Major Chinese Cross-Border Insolvency Cases, 6-12 (May
1, 2005) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
527 Moir, supra note 3.
528 Id.
529 Moir, supra note 52.
530 In GITIC's liquidation, only RMB 20 million was validated, representing a
minuscule return for creditors with claims on GITIC's HKD 8.1 billion debt and
coming only "in dribbles over a long period of time." Block Probe, supra note 365.
Creditors struggled just to get 15% back on their loans. Tom Mitchell, GITIC HQ
Buyer Fails to Seal Deal; Three Large Payments Are Overdue As Banks Refuse to Lend to
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to liquidate after removing as much as possible from the reach of
liquidators. Countervailing this, there were several factors pushing ZMG to appease creditors. Economically speaking, at some
point in the future ZMG would want to borrow again and the better their current relationship with banks, the better the terms at
which this would be able to happen. Perhaps even more potent
than ZMG's future economic status was the lurking question of
corruption, as it would be an exception to the rule in the PRC if
there were no corruption at all amid the vast amounts of money
changing hands in relation to ZKG.5 31 As highlighted by the
threats to attack officials involved, those who dipped their hands
into this honey pot had a strong urge to make sure that creditors
did not dig too far into records that might reveal illicit transactions.
Finally, there was pressure, albeit muted, from Beijing to resolve
the situation,532 since Beijing could hardly have been happy when
such prominent debacles of state-sponsored corporate mismanagement splashed across newspapers and stung major institutional
investors.
Ultimately, on July 29, 2005, ZKG's creditors signed a memorandum of understanding to accept an HKD 3.2 billion settlement
offer. 533 True to the earlier reports, ZKG was bailed out by ICBC as
part of a "far-reaching financing agreement" with ZMG. 534 Assets
seized by RSM in Hong Kong would be returned to ZKG and held
by ICBC as security on the loan to ZMG. Furthermore, the winding-up proceedings would be stayed. 535
Finally, after years of contentious negotiations, creditors were able to
put this episode behind them. ZKG continues to conduct some of the activities that it was previously involved in.536 And ZMG finally received

a Consortium After 'Unfortunate Events', S. CHINA MORNING POST, Sept. 10, 2003, at
1, availableat 2003 WLNR 5916104.
531 See Lubman, supra note 6, at 404-05 (noting the pervasiveness of corruption in China).
532 Block Probe, supra note 365.
533 China's ICBC Funds 3.2 Bln HKD Bailout of Zhuhai Government Co, Xinhua
Financial Network News, Aug. 4, 2005, available at LEXIS News & Business, News,
News, All (English, Full Text) [hereinafter China'sICBC].
534
535

Id.
Id.

536 Jiuzhou Development Company Limited was formerly known as Zhu
Kuan Development Company Limited. The Group's principal activities are the
management of a holiday resort, theme park, and amusement park and the provi-
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537
more financing with which it could pursue its lofty development plans.

Table 2: Summary of Offers RegardingZKG's HKD 7.8 Billion Debt
Cash Amount
(HKD billion)
Over 4

Creditors' Return (%)

Result

45%539

Revised in June

Over 4

Over 40541

2.05544

18545

Majority of creditors accepted; ZMG reneged 54 2
Creditors unanimously re-

August

2.25548

21549

2003547
February

Majority of creditors rejected 5 0

2.52552

21.33553

Rejected 554

3.2556

40557

Accepted558

Offer
March
2002538

June
2002540
July
2003543

jected 546

2005551

July
2005555

sion of port facilities and ticketing services in Zhuhai, People's Republic of China.
Other activities include provision of ferry services, investment holding and property holding businesses. The Group's operation is carried out mainly in the People's Republic of China. Jiuzhou Development Company Limited- Company Profile
Snapshot, WRIGHTREPORTs, http://wrightreports.ecnext.com/coms2/reportdesc-

COMPANYC344G5670 (last visited Apr. 1, 2006).
537 LeeMaster, supra note 202.
538 RSM, supra note 37, para. 227.
539

Id.

540

Moir, supranote 191.

541

Id.

542
543
544
545

Moir, supra note 48.
Moir, supra note 252.
Mc ir, supra note 38.
Mc9ir, supra note 48.
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Moir,
Moir,
Id.
Moir,
Id.
Moir,
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Id.
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supra note 191.
supra note 48.
supra note 191.
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Rejection of this was implicit in their acceptance of the July 2005 offer.
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3. PROBLEMS APPARENT IN THE ZHU KUAN CASE
3.1. Poor CorporateGovernance
3.1.1. State-induced corporatemismanagement
In the newly-capitalist Communist Party, members no longer
rise through the ranks strictly by becoming an outspoken Marxist
ideologue but instead must now raise capital and build things -the
bigger, the better.55 9 There is perhaps no better case in point than
Liang. Despite planning failures and ZKG's incurring massive
debt under his watch, 560 Liang has not been accused of any wrongdoing by creditors or anyone else. Far from it: Liang found himself promoted to membership on the NPCSC.561 Liang's continuing
political success, and that of others like him, sends a perverse message to government officials: massive debts to international creditors funding high-risk speculative investments are alright as long
as you can attribute some apparent development to your name.
Lenders need to take heed of this incentive as an additional risk
factor when lending to SOEs.
ZMG as a whole shared with Liang the goal of transforming
Zhuhai, 562 with each individual subject to the same incentives as
Liang. There was hardly even a suggestion that their goal was to
create profit-bearing activities that would serve to repay the massive debts ZMG forced ZKG to incur to fund Zhuhai's development. Banks ignored these signals, and ZMG succeeded in transforming Zhuhai despite the massive collateral damage. Chinese
officials -having seen that no matter how much their finances diverge from traditional lending standards, there has still been
someone willing to lend to them (ZMG even arranged the loan in
2005 to help with ZKD's debt) -have had little reason to worry

LeeMaster, supra note 202.
Id.
559 See, e.g., Joseph Kahn, Investment Bubble Builds New China, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
23, 2005, at C1 (arguing that local governments often favor large infrastructure
projects even when there may be better ways to spend money).
560 See supra notes 27-29 and accompanying text (noting the high level of development under Liang's watch).
561 Miller & Clifford, supra note 3.
562 Id.
557
558
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about actually repaying loans to assure future affordable financing.
Directors of SOEs such as ZKG hardly have the chance to take up
the mantle of "profit-seeking corporate director" when forced to
kowtow at the feet of their political masters. When determining
risk in the PRC, creditors cannot afford to ignore that their goal
(i.e., profit) will often conflict with the governments' goals (e.g.,
development) and, further, that local governments are not above
fleeing once the funds have served their purpose.
3.1.2. Lack of transparency
From ZKD's request to shareholders to buy back and/or issue
new stock to the blatant avoidance of court-mandated disclosure
by removing records from Hong Kong, the lack of transparency
was a pervasive problem in determining the financial status of
ZKG. A representative of the creditors said of ZKG that "[t]here
needs to be full transparency of the financial dealings of the
group." 56 3

Unfortunately, now that a deal has been concluded and

given the potential for such transparency to reveal illicit activities
or just embarrassing mismanagement, this did not and will likely
never happen.
3.1.3. Illegal activities
When dealing with large amounts of money and relatively lowpaid municipal administrators in the PRC, corruption is ubiquitous. While there is no smoking gun pointing to corruption in the
ZKG case, the tendency for corruption in PRC SOEs and the adamance with which ZMG has refused to divulge records suggests
that there is likely corruption or other illicit activity hidden within
the records of ZKG. Such activity is difficult to avoid when doing
business in the PRC. It is also difficult to quantify the risk of its occurrence. Nevertheless, the potential for parties to be involved in
illicit activities cannot be ignored when conducting business of any
sort in the PRC.
3.1.5. Inability to hold directors and employees liable
Only seventeen countries have signed extradition treaties with
the PRC; even Hong Kong and Macau have not.5 64 One oft-cited
563

Miller & Clifford, supra note 3.

564 CHAU PAK-KWAN
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565
reason is the concern about PRC's record on human rights, but just
the chance of being dragged into the roulette wheel of the PRC legal
system-even for simple economic misfeasance -seems a sufficient
deterrent. In either case, the door is wide open for PRC nationals to
simply stay out of the jurisdiction when it becomes likely that legal
action could be taken against them.5 66 ZKG made ample use of this,
beginning with ZKG's alleged boarding up of its offices in 1998 and
continuing with ZKG directors' safety in Zhuhai. This effectively lets
PRC nationals take the home field advantage in litigation.

SECRETARIAT, RESEARCH STUDY ON THE AGREEMENT BETWEEN HONG KONG AND THE

21 (2001), available at
http://www.legco.gov.hk/yrOO-O/english/library/erpO5.pdf (last visited Apr.
1, 2006) (describing how when China signs extradition treaties with countries such
as Belarus, Bulgaria, Cambodia, Kazakhstan, Kirghizstan, Mongolia, Romania,
Russia, Thailand, and Ukraine it always adopts a "method of exclusion"); ChinaSouth Africa Leaders Launch Bilateral Commission, BBC WORLDWIDE MONITORING,
Dec. 10, 2001, available at LEXIS News & Business, Country & Region (excluding
U.S.), Asia Pacific, News, Asia/Pacific Rim Archive News; China to Strengthen Cooperation with Laos: PremierZhu, XINHUA GEN. NEWS SERV., Feb. 4, 2002, available at
LEXIS News & Business, Country & Region (excluding U.S.), Asia Pacific, News,
Asia/Pacific Rim Archive News; Chinese Foreign Minister, Tunisian Counterpart
Discuss Sino-Arab Ties, Terrorism, BBC WORLDWIDE MONITORING, Nov. 9, 2001,
available at LEXIS News & Business, Country & Region (excluding U.S.), Asia Pacific, News, Asia/Pacific Rim Archive News; Extradition Treaty Between South Korea, China to Take Effect in April, BBC MONITORING REPORTS, Mar. 13, 2002, available
at LEXIS News & Business, Country & Region (excluding U.S.), Asia Pacific,
News, Asia/Pacific Rim Archive News; Lithuania Ratifies Extradition Treaty with
China, GLOBAL NEWS WIRE, Oct. 31, 2002, available at LEXIS, News & Business,
Country & Region (excluding U.S.), Asia/Pacific Rim Archive News (Lithuania);
Pakistan, China Agree to Sign Extradition Treaty, THE PAK. NEWSWIRE, Mar. 2, 2003,
available at LEXIS News & Business, Country & Region (excluding U.S.), Asia Pacific, News, Asia/Pacific Rim Archive News; Norman P. Aquino, RP,China Sign
18 Agreements, BUSINESSWORLD, Nov. 1, 2001, at 1, available at LEXIS News & Business, Country & Region (excluding U.S.), Asia Pacific, News, Asia/Pacific Rim
Archive News; U.A.E.: UAE and China Sign Extradition Treaty, THE EMIRATES, May
14, 2002, available at LEXIS News & Business, Country & Region (excluding U.S.),
Asia Pacific, News, Asia/Pacific Rim Archive News.
565 Leahy, supra note 1.
566 Shutting operations and fleeing the jurisdiction seems to be a common
strategy for PRC entities:
MAINLAND CONCERNING SURRENDER OF FUGITIVE OFFENDERS

It is not just lenders who have been suckered by dreams of avarice in
China. In the last couple of years, several privately owned Chinese companies listed in Hong Kong have failed spectacularly, leaving investors
and the authorities helpless as the Hong Kong offices were shuttered and
management stayed safely ensconced in the mainland, suitably enriched
courtesy of gullible international investors.
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3.2. Ineffective Legal Remedy in the PRC
3.2.1. Lack of an independentjudiciary
In the PRC, the home field advantage is a big one. Courts in
the PRC are a division of the government in which they sit, effectively making them beholden to the government's prerogatives.
McDonald said, "[w]hen you sit in front of a judge in Zhuhai, they
don't see it as their problem. The courts are seen as an element of
the party!"567 Furthermore, "[t]he People's Court has historically
preserved and enforced the interests of 'the State."'5 68 Cairns
elaborated, "[t]hey're not an independent judiciary.... [T]hey're
there to follow party policy. If the policy is that we've borrowed
this money from Johnny foreigner and we don't have to pay it
back, that's what they are going to do."569 Without judicial independence in the PRC, litigation which conflicts with state interests
will rarely be successful unless a party can escape to a jurisdiction
in which the state actor in question is less influential, as RSM did in
the Zhu Kuan case.
3.2.2. Lack of professionaljudges
Beyond being beholden to government interests, judges often
simply lack the knowledge required to rule effectively, especially
outside of major cities. McDonald said, "Try to recover the loans
and you're dealing with courts that have a very poor understanding of liquidations."5 70 The judges were more than willing to accept utterly false readings of PRC law, which would doubtless be
overturned on appeal. Even assuming ZMG pressure, it would
seem that the judiciary should have nevertheless been able to tell
ZMG what the ultimate result would be. Unless they did so and
ZMG used litigation as merely a delaying tactic, it seems that ZIC
simply did not understand the laws. While litigating in large, sophisticated cities in the PRC can remediate this to some extent, the
only sure-fire way to get a qualified judge is to file actions in a
more mature legal system when possible.

567

Id.

568
569

Hilken, supra note 463.
Leahy, supra note 1.

570

Id.
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3.3. Lack of Applicable Laws
Of the major problems in the Zhu Kuan case, the lack of applicable laws is the one most likely to show immediate improvement;
the promulgation of the EBL is expected within the next few years
after more than a decade of delay. The new law is being hailed as a
quantum leap forward and is being welcomed across the board. It
is largely consistent with international norms. It gives the liquidation administrator the power to review questionable transactions
in the months leading up to the bankruptcy. Even those with res5 71
ervations see the EBL as a step in the right direction.
Unfortunately, the proposed EBL is unlikely to live up to its
full on-paper potential in the short term, as it will do nothing to
572
remedy the problems of what McDonald calls a "rotten system."
Most prominently, no matter how good any law in the PRC is, enforcement will be extremely difficult, if not impossible when litigating against those closely connected to a government subdivision
with power over the courts. The effectiveness of the new bankruptcy law, called into question as the courts' role of protecting the
interest of the state, is enshrined in the new law. 573 The lack of expertise in the courts also poses a formidable problem. "The draft
law places a lot of responsibility and discretionary authority on the
People's Courts. So the effectiveness of the law very much depends on the technical competence, experience and even availabil5 74
ity of the court."
McDonald doubts the efficacy of the EBL and questions
whether it would have been of any use to ZKG's creditors. Article
8 expressly provides for the recognition of foreign liquidations.
However, they are only permitted if they do not violate the interests and rights of state and domestic creditors. This seems to guarantee the rights of government and domestic creditors over those
of foreigners, which would have made many of ZKG's asset transfers defensible. "If the draft law is to benefit investors and creditors," McDonald explains, "the People's Court must find a way to
limit the rights of the State to interfere with the bankruptcy process
so as to obtain preferential treatment for the State or domestic

573

Hilken, supra note 463.
Id.
Id.

574

Id.

571
572
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creditors." 575 As the Zhu Kuan case demonstrates, this seems
unlikely to happen without major systemic changes.
4. LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE ZHU KUAN CASE

4.1. Determining Creditworthiness
4.1.1. Increasedrisks from unfounded positive predictions
Creditors must show greater care when analyzing the creditworthiness of entities and transactions in the PRC. ZKG and ZMG
spewed out all sorts of rosy predictions about virtually everything
they did while risk factors were minimized or simply not presented to potential lenders and investors. Creditors' best approach
here would be to simply hold Chinese companies up to the same
standard they would a non-Chinese company. While that may not
always be practical given the nature of the Chinese system, any
raising of the bar before being convinced of the soundness of an
investment would better protect creditors and investors from hazards such as the ones they faced with ZKG.
4.1.2. Increased risks from state demands on SOEs
Creditors would be wise to more carefully evaluate the risk of
SOEs especially. ZKG played their cards quite well. When it
suited them, they blurred distinctions to seem a governmental
body, with all the benefits that status supposedly brought: most
notably, presumed assumed protection from default. When trouble arose, suddenly ZKG became a private enterprise and the government was a separate entity with priority to get back the money
ZKG allegedly owed to it. Lenders need to stop ignoring the now
obvious fact that the state cannot be presumptively relied on to
back loans to SOEs. Furthermore, powerful SOEs in a given jurisdiction often wield considerable political influence that can hinder
or block effective judicial remedy.5 76 When push comes to shove,
local governments will step in to protect their interests in the SOEs,
creating a further risk factor to be accounted for when evaluating
Id.
See, e.g., Matthew D. Latimer, Note, Gilding the Iron Rice Bowl: The Illusion
of Shareholder Rights in China, 69 WASH. L. REV. 1097, 1109-11 (1994) (discussing
how powerful SOEs can obstruct judicial enforcement of shareholder rights).
575

576
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SOEs.
The benefits from state to SOE do not flow in only one direction, and creditors need to be aware of potential conflicting interests when dealing with SOEs.5 77 Under normal business circumstances, loans are used to improve a company's ability to make a
profit, whether directly or indirectly. However, in the case of an
SOE, the normal goal of seeking profits might be undermined by
officials' desires to move up in the CCP. In the PRC, cadres who
have built big are also often those that move up. 578 This could lead
to a situation in which an official might be perfectly content to ignore profit-seeking altogether and run an SOE into the ground,
laden with debt, if he can tie some huge infrastructure project to
his name, as was arguably the case in ZMG.
4.1.3. Increased risks from lack of accountability
Lacking accountability, local state actors in the PRC will follow
the rules, whether contractual or legal, only when it suits them.
ZKG broadly defied various court orders, regulations, and laws.
Contractual abrogation was evident in the ZHC bonds; ZMG
found it inconvenient to follow the terms of the contract and thus
declined to do so, while ZKG flouted its contractual obligation because of a lack of funds. ZKD even disregarded its own articles of
incorporation to prevent RSM from electing members to the board.
When it suited their interests, ZMG gave ZKG the land-use rights
to large tracts of land in Zhuhai. 579 However, when it ran contrary
58 0 S&P's
to their interests, they took it back without compensation.
2001 report said, "the abrogation of contractual obligations could
have implications for the reputation of Chinese entities toward adherence to the enforcement of contractual obligations." 81 Creditors must be extremely wary when relying primarily on contractual
577 See Simon Cartledge, Big Price, Big Risk, Big Hope for Hang Seng, S. CHINA
MORNING PosT, Dec. 20, 2003, available at 2003 WLNR 5948228 ("As both the collapse of Gitic and the ongoing saga at the Zhuhai government-controlled Zhu
Kuan Group show, local governments in China can have interests that conflict
with those of the banks which supplied them with money.").
578 See supra notes 559-61 and accompanying text.
579 See Miller & Clifford, supra note 3; see also supra notes 252-57 and accompanying text (explaining land deals between ZKG and ZMG).
580 See supra sections 2.5.2-.3 (discussing the land transactions between ZKG
and ZMG).
581 Gesteland, supra note 14.
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obligations to bind a state actor, as the Zhu Kuan case demonstrates that they are far from reliable.
The lack of accountability also applied in economic terms. International lenders' overeagerness to pounce on the Chinese market created a situation of moral hazard in which even directors
who made economically poor choices continued to have access to
capital. Furthermore, domestic Chinese banks were notoriously
poor at assessing risk, thus opening the door for more easily replaceable financing.5 82 As long as financing continues to be had so
easily, there is little incentive for economic actors to modify their
behavior.
4.1.4. Increased risks from culturalattitude towards debt
There also seems to be an issue regarding state officials' attitude toward paying back loans. According to Cairns, "[tihere's a
massive cultural disconnect [between international banks and
Asian borrowers] ....[O]ften the banks bring a very Western
mindset to things and it doesn't work. The banks lend some
money and then ask for it back and the company says, '[B]ut you
lent it to me!'" 583 As with the Zhu Kuan case, this tendency is even
more exaggerated when Chinese SOEs are involved. McDonald
says, "All the money has been spent on government infrastructure ... , there's this expectation that they'd never really have to
pay the money back." 58 4 Cairns offers solid advice in this regard:
"There's no point criticizing China for it and saying 'why aren't
you like the US?' They're not: that's the system. No one's forced
to lend money to them. Don't criticize them for not being like us.
It's unfair and unrealistic."5 85 The implication here is that creditors
need to think of loans in the cultural terms that the borrowers do
and include the increased likelihood that the loan will never be returned due to this attitude as part of their risk assessment.

582

Bank Regulator in China Issues Directive on Risk, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 28, 2005, at

583

Leahy, supranote 1 (internal quotations omitted).
Id. (internal quotations omitted).
Id. (internal quotations omitted).
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4.1.5. Increased risks when SOE assets are in the jurisdictionof the
state owner
The ultimate effective value of an SOE's assets to creditors is
extremely questionable when they are located in the jurisdiction of
their governmental owner. Such assets should not be counted
strongly as a risk-mitigating factor in the case of liquidation as,
under the existing legal regime, the state actor can at least impede
and, at most, completely block creditors from obtaining access to
those assets.
4.1.6. Decreased risks when SOE assets are not in the jurisdictionof
the state owner
On the other hand, the more assets an SOE holds outside of its
own jurisdiction that cannot be easily removed to its own jurisdiction, the less the risk for creditors. Even an alternative jurisdiction
in the PRC to the state actor's home jurisdiction might be favorable. This is apparent in the Zhu Kuan case when ZMG attempted
to have the ultimate appeal of the land-use rights forfeiture litigation sent to XDC so the ultimate appeal would be in ZIC. The
creditors attack demonstrates the perceived value of taking the
case to GHC, a move that would allow creditors to escape the
problems of immediate control of the judiciary by what is essentially the other party in the litigation and, at least to some degree,
the more general local favoritism. Thus, when litigation against
SOEs in the PRC is the best course of action, creditors should
minimize exposure to the jurisdictions immediately under the opposing state actor.
The benefits of an alternative jurisdiction are far more prominent, however, when the alternative jurisdiction is outside of the
PRC, in places with more reliable legal systems. As many of the
places where Chinese SOEs often go to conduct business activities
fit this bill, such as Hong Kong or Macau, this can be a powerful
tool for creditors. This approach amplifies the benefits of litigating
elsewhere within the PRC by further removing state actors from
the usually cozy guanxi they share with state actors outside of their
immediate jurisdictions. Furthermore, it allows creditors to reduce
or avoid exposure to other systemic problems in the PRC legal system, such as judicial incompetence or corruption that would not be
avoided in other PRC jurisdictions. The repeated rulings in favor
of the creditors by the Hong Kong, Macanese, and BVI courts all
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol27/iss2/5
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demonstrate the utter inability of Chinese SOEs and state actors to
extract the same kind of lopsided rulings that they can comfortably
obtain in their home jurisdiction. These judgments all took a nononsense approach to cross-border insolvency that bodes well for
creditors in the future, even when litigating against Chinese SOEs.
As the jurisdiction of choice for most PRC window companies, 586 the Hong Kong case in particular has been hailed as a watershed because formerly PRC courts dealt with bankruptcies of
mainland government investment arms or protracted debt workouts occurred to prevent liquidation altogether.5 87 The Zhu Kuan
case opens them all up to jurisdiction in Hong Kong and increases
creditors' chances of recovering money by allowing them to avoid
588
PRC litigation, provided there are assets in Hong Kong.
4.1.7. Increased risks when dealing with Zhuhai
Finally, perhaps without requiring mention, ZMG and its related SOEs are virtually worthy of blacklisting. Borrelli said in
2003, "based on what we've seen to date,... anyone considering
extending substantial credit in similar circumstances to Zhuhai
should proceed with extreme caution." 589 In 2001, S&P reported
that ZHC's default on bond payments would "have implications
for future transactions involving the Zhuhai government and its
affiliates."5 90 After the complete collapse of ZKG, the a fortiorari
conclusion is apparent: lending to ZMG and any enterprise that
answers to it is likely to leave creditors burnt. ZKG creditors, at
least, seem to have taken this to heart; as one creditor said, "Nobody in their right state of mind would lend [ZMG] money.... I
really don't know how they are going to survive." 591 Nevertheless,
ZMG managed to borrow funds for the 2005 offer, although sig592
nificant collateral was put up for them.
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Moir, supra note 52.
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Id.
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Kendall, supra note 65, at 41.
Miller & Clifford, supra note 3.
Gesteland, supra note 14 (internal quotations omitted).
Moir, supra note 38.
See supra section 2.9 (discussing lending to ZMG).
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4.2. Managing Loans
4.2.1. Secure debt
With extremely high risks, creditors should take steps to secure
their debts. ZKG's secured loans point to a tendency to give a better deal to other PRC companies, but international institutional investors should also have that option available when they are in a
stronger bargaining position, such as before they actually provide
the funds. The bail-out loan with the assets put up as security is a
good example of this. Needless to say, low interest rates should
not be an option for such risky SOEs, barring extensive assets as
security.
4.2.2. Demand information disclosure
Creditors can demand regular disclosure requirements from
debtors. To be even more aggressive, creditors may want to consider seeking representation in the board of companies they deem
to be particularly risky, such as government-tied companies. 593
While both of these methods are far from foolproof, early signs of
insufficient disclosure could at least give creditors more time to
prepare to protect their interests.
4.3. Litigating
4.3.1. Litigate outside of the PRCfirst
The broadest conclusion of the Zhu Kuan case is that it is a
struggle for creditors to protect their rights in the PRC when dealing with SOEs, even when they are based outside the PRC.594 Steven Vickers, president of International Risk, a global risk management company, says, "[y]ou have poorly regulated markets in a

593 See Angela Wang, Partner, Angela Wang & Co., Inter-Chambers Breakfast
Presentation: Managing Legal Risk When Doing Business and Taking Security in
China Uan. 12, 2005) (PowerPoint presentation and notes on file with author)
(stating that one of the only effective ways to prevent the kind of asset stripping
that occurred in the ZKG case is for those taking risks to insist on board representation and disclosure).
594 See Miller, supra note 4 ("The twisted story of the Zhu Kuan Group is also
a reminder of how difficult it is for investors, even in Hong Kong-domiciled
mainland companies, to protect their rights.").
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hothouse economy ....With variable enforcement you get an explosive mix [in which creditors can find themselves] fleeced by
powers beyond their reach." 595 While relief may be available in
other jurisdictions, that relief is limited to what that jurisdiction of597
fers 596 and by courts that are reluctant to take further measures.
The two SARs have no jurisdiction over any other part of the PRC,
5 98
and other PRC courts do not need to recognize their decisions.
Nevertheless, alternative jurisdictions can often be preferable to
the PRC. Practitioners have historically recommended litigation in
the PRC only as a last resort, promoting instead other options such
as resolving the problem in an offshore arbitration center.5 99 RSM's
litigation in the PRC does not suggest a movement away from this
sound advice but rather a situation in which it was forced into litigation by the asset-stripping actions of ZMG.600 The persistent
problems in the Chinese judicial system are myriad, and include
prohibitive fees, 601 corruption, 6 2 poorly trained judges60 3 and law6 5 absence of rule of law,60 6
yers, 60 4 a lack of judicial independence,
Luck, supra note 210.
See, e.g., Prosperfield Ventures v. Tripole Trading, [2004] HCA
5370D/1993 (H.C.) at 15, http://legalref.judiciary.gov.hk/lrs/common/search/
searchresult-detailframe.jsp?DIS=24752&QS=%28%7BHCA5370%2F1993%7D%
[hereinafter Prosper7C%7BHCA005370%2F1993%7D+%25caseno%29&TP=JU
field Ventures] (discussing problem of obtaining jurisdiction over Defendant); see
also Luck, supra note 210 (discussing the lack of efficacy of the ruling in the Prosperfield case despite clear wrongdoing due to the lack of cross-border enforcement).
597 Prosperfield Ventures, supra note 596, at
98 (refusing to grant an injunction that could permit fines, arrests, or even imprisonment for losing PRC parties
should they enter Hong Kong for fear of the effects such a ruling would have on
Hong Kong and PRC securities markets).
598 Luck, supra note 210.
599 Moir, supra note 478.
600 But see, id. ("The fact that liquidators - as in the Zhu Kuan case - in Hong
Kong are even considering mainland courts for redress suggests a change in perception about the kind of justice on offer, albeit subtle. Alternatively, there is the
possibility that potential litigants are more savvy to the risk management involved.").
601 See supranotes 484-85 and accompanying text (discussing high cost fees).
602 See Lubman, supra note 6, at 404 ("So tightly knit are corrupt practices into
the fabric of modem Chinese society that they are almost invisible.").
603 See Moir, supra note 478 ("In the past, judges were predominantly partyappointed officials with little or no legal experience.").
604 Id. (asserting that the quality of lawyers is crucial because it is up to the
lawyers to help judges - often poorly trained - to understand the case and sug595
596
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local protectionism (including that of SOEs),607 decision making
based on extrajudicial considerations, 608 and enforcement difficulties.60 9 Notably at issue in the case of debt recovery is the lack of
610
effective recovery mechanisms.
Kendall suggests some strategies for accessing courts in Hong
Kong:
[F]oreign investors thinking about lending money to a PRC
entity may consider establishing a Hong Kong connection
as early as possible. This may be done by ensuring that the
loan documentation is negotiated and executed in Hong
Kong and made subject to Hong Kong law. Provision may
also be made for the loan to be repaid through Hong
61
Kong. '
While this may not be conclusive evidence of sufficient connection to Hong Kong, it would increase the chances of a court accepting jurisdiction in circumstances where a winding-up becomes inevitable. 612 It would be wise to take similar measures in other
jurisdictions as well.
4.3.2. Aggressively forum shop in the PRC
When there is no choice but to litigate in the PRC, it is imperative to pick the optimal forum. In the Zhu Kuan case, ZMG's forum selection maneuvers were designed to place the final appeal of
any result in the courts they could best influence, a move especially
dangerous to creditors given the "locals never lose" rule when litigating in the PRC against the well-connected in their local jurisdic613
tion.
gesting that many lawyers are not getting this important task done).
605 Id.
606 Id.
607

Id.

Id. ("The outcome could be less favorable if you are a company unlikely
to do more business in China.").
69 Id.
610 V. Anantha Nageswaran, China Can't Fill Economic Void Left by America,
Bus. TIMES SINGAPORE, Aug. 17, 2004, available at LEXIS News & Business, Country
& Region (excluding U.S.), Asia/Pacific Rim News, Current.
611 Kendall, supra note 65, at 42.
608

612

Id.

613

Luck, supra note 210.
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4.3.3. Call on guanxi
Of course the importance of guanxi cannot be underestimated.
While such connections are not apparent on the surface of the Zhu
Kuan case, both the creditors on the one hand, and ZKG and ZMG
on the other, used this to their best advantage. For creditors, this
undoubtedly meant going to Guangzhou and Beijing to seek assistance from those best placed to help them. While nothing pointed
directly to Beijing's involvement, central officials can be assumed
to have at least pressed ZMG to resolve this conflict, even as other
central officials were pulling strings for ZMG. The lesson here for
creditors is to not only use guanxi but also to make them in the first
place.
5. CONCLUSION
Financial institutions have been lending to the PRC for years,
614
despite the lack of bankruptcy law, transparency, or rule of law.
Creditors claim that, at least in the case of dealing with SOEs, the
lesson has been learned the hard way. Sullivan states that these
practices are now a thing of the past:
We learned ....Our credit processes are being tightened
and we are smarter, I hope, than we were [ten] years ago.
At the end of the day, we are in the banking business and
we take risks. But I think we are managing that as well as
615
we can.
Another creditor noted, "[n]o more participation with
mainland government enterprises.., we are never, ever going to
the government is the user
lend money for working capital where 616
lesson."
our
learned
We
of these funds.
Nevertheless, while many international financial institutions
have been hurt by PRC corporate downfalls, the chance of hitting it
big, or even just getting established in the most populous country
on Earth, will continue to keep memories short and allow investors
and lenders to get burnt anew. 617 For financial institutions that
See Leahy, supra note 1 (describing the hazards of lending in China).
Moir, supra note 8, at 16.
616 Moir, supra note 3, at 2.
617 See Leahy, supra note 1 ("'You can't afford not to be in China,' [Cairns]
says. 'Banks know that: it's too big to ignore. China's always been the next big
614
615
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cannot handle the effects of regular massive downfalls of indebted
PRC companies, the best advice is to avoid domestic PRC enterprises altogether. For the majority of these major international financial institutions, however, the question is not whether to enter
the PRC but how to minimize the risk when already in the PRC.
After various collapses related to the Asian financial crisis,
"[b]usinessmen [in Asia] seem to be more conservative." 618 However, the seeds of future collapses seem to have been planted already. According to Cairns, "[y]ou have a lot of money chasing a
home.... [Y]ou see a yield and you go for it. A lot of the credit
processes [get] squashed on the way. [An Asian financial crisis]
will happen again." 619 Appleby takes a similarly dark view, "Asia
hasn't learned. For every shining example where corporate governance has improved, there are nine where they've gone
down."62 Any slow down in the PRC economy is likely to force
more bankruptcies like ZKG,621 and with those bankruptcies will
be Zhu Kuan-like messes involving foreign financial institutions.
The pending bankruptcy law does offer some hope that the
mess of PRC bankruptcy will simmer down. But even this will
take time to filter through the system.622 In the best case scenario,
there are at least several more years ahead in which international
financial institutions must continue to deal with the corporate implosions they have become all too familiar with. Even when judges
fully understand the new PRC bankruptcy law, systemic problems
preventing an effective implementation of rule of law could render
the law impotent.
The ambivalence of the PRC's still-transitioning economy is apparent
in the Zhu Kuan case. With ZMG's broad corporate activities and interests, their function in this regard seems less like a municipal government
and more like a parent company, albeit with goals not related to profits.
This phenomenon is repeated throughout China at the provincial and mu-

thing."').
618 Id. (quoting Dr. Marc Faber, Managing Director of Marc Faber Ltd.).
619
620

Id.
Id.

Miller & Clifford, supra note 3.
See Leahy, supra note 1 ("McDonald explains, 'It's one thing to say that
China will have a bankruptcy law next year, but you've got to get that law implemented through the provinces. It will take time for new laws to be understood
properly.'").
621

622
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nicipal levels as well as in TVEs. Were there an effective legal means in
the PRC to treat a bankrupt municipal government as a bankrupt parent
company, problems such as fighting the share transfer to BVI would be
resolved since the BVI enterprises would be subsidiaries of ZMG. Even
if creditors had a legal remedy available to them, they would still face the
PRC courts. In addition to the typical systemic problems, litigation in the
court of the bankrupt subdivision in question would be tantamount to litigating in a department of the bankrupted company. For the time being, at
least, investors and creditors have little choice but to continue dealing
with the inherent ambivalence in the changing PRC system and all the accompanying risks and opportunities.
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